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Building Bridges: International
Trade Law, Internet Governance,
and the Regulation of Data Flows
Neha Mishra*
ABSTRACT

The regulation of internet data flows touches upon various
distinct disciplines including internet governance and
international trade law. In internet governance, three
fundamental principles, namely, internet openness, internet
security, and internetprivacy apply to regulationof internet data
flows. This Article argues that internet privacy and security,
when implemented in a reasoned and transparent manner by
different
stakeholders, enable
internet openness-thus,
challenging the dominant perspective that cybersecurity and
privacy requirementsconstrainthe free flow of data. Further, this
Article introduces a unique perspective by arguing that these
three principles (notwithstandingtheir nonbinding nature)play
an important role in applying trade law to data restrictive
measures, particularly by facilitating a sound framework that
balances domestic internet regulationand liberaliseddata flows,
thus contributing to balancing of trade and non-trade policy
goals. Given this important relationship between trade and
internet governance, this Article suggests that different options
must be explored to enhance dialogue and coordinationbetween
these two policy communities so as to build a sound, balanced,
and holistic regulatory environment for cross-borderdata flows.
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I. INTRODUCTION
At first sight, international trade law appears disconnected from
internet governance due to the stark divergence in the legal and
institutional structures of the two regimes. While international trade
law governs relationships amongst countries, internet governance is
considered to be a largely multistakeholder process aimed at
policymaking for a universal and global internet, unconstrained by
national borders.' International trade law comprises rules developed
by countries through negotiated agreements at the World Trade
Organization (WTO)2 and other mechanisms such as preferential trade
agreements (PTAs).3 Several provisions, including obligations on
nondiscrimination and market access, within international trade
agreements are binding and enforceable, such that government
measures that constitute barriers to trade may be actionable in
international trade law. In contrast, different aspects of internet
policymaking are dispersed across government departments, 4
multistakeholder bodies,5
multilateral institutions (e.g., the

1.
CTR. FOR INT'L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION & THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INT'L
AFFAIRS, GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE: ONE INTERNET 9-10 (2016),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig-final-report_-_with-cover.pdf
[https://perma.ccl2VU6-PRP9] (archived Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter GCIG ONE
INTERNET].
2.
Understandingthe WTO, WORLD TRADE ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/
thewto_elwhatis e/tif e/tif e.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2019) [https://perma.cclVP9E2EXR] (archived Jan 15, 2019).
3.
PTAs cover all international trade agreements outside of the WTO such as
regional trade agreements, bilateral trade agreements, or megaregional trade
agreements.
4.
For example, the governmental trade agency is likely to deal with ecommerce-related issues, the ministry of telecommunications would deal with issues of
internet connectivity and broadband supply, the law enforcement authorities would
investigate cybercrime issues, while increasingly, the homeland security department
would deal with cybersecurity issues.
5.
The key multistakeholder institutions in the internet governance community
are the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF),
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), World Wide Web
Consortium (W3C), and the Internet Society (ISOC). See generally CTR. FOR INT'L
GOVERNANCE INNOVATION & THE ROYAL INSTITUTE FOR INT'L AFFAIRS, GLOBAL
COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE: WHO RUNS THE INTERNET? (2016),
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6
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and other specialised
8
7
agencies of the United Nations (UN)), and regional organisations.
9
Further, civil society organisations and technology companies'o play
an instrumental role in internet governance. Principles of internet
governance can be derived from multiple sources: declarations and
resolutions of multilateral and multistakeholder bodies, standards and
recommendations of multistakeholder bodies such as the Internet

2
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/GCIG%20Volume%202% 0WE
B.pdf [https://perma.cc/G9KR-PKPA] (archived Mar. 13, 2019).
Since the 2012 proceedings of the World Conference on International
6.
Communications (WCIT-12), concerns have been raised regarding the increasing role of

the ITU in internet governance. See generally, e.g., RICHARD BENNETT, THE INFO. TECH.
& INNOVATION FOUND., THE GATHERING STORM: WCIT AND THE GLOBAL REGULATION

OF THE INTERNET (2012), http://www2.itif.org/2012-gathering-storm-weitregulations.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q7BE-L9SV] (archived Jan. 15, 2019); David P.
Fidler, Internet Governance and InternationalLaw: The Controversy Concerning
Revision of the InternationalTelecommunication Regulations, 17 INSIGHTS 6 (Feb. 7,
2013), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/17/issue/6/internet-governance-andinternational-law-controversy-concerning-revision [https://perma.cc/LJF4-STM5]
(archived Jan. 15, 2019); Jemima Kiss, ITU and Google faceoff at Dubai conference over
future of the internet, THE GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2012), https://www.theguardian.coml
technology/2012/dec/03/telecoms-unitednations [https://perma.cclL93M-KT9W]
(archived on Jan. 15, 2019). However, other experts have argued that the International
Telecommunication Regulations adopted at WCIT-12 did not deal with internet
governance issues at all. See, e.g., RICHARD HILL, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATION REGULATIONS AND THE INTERNET 35-68 (2014). Nonetheless, the

ITU has been active in dealing with issues in cybersecurity and privacy through its
recommendations, reports, as well as the annual Global Cybersecurity Index. See, e.g.,
&

INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, PRIVACY IN CLOUD COMPUTING: ITU TECH. WATCH REP.
(2012); INT'L TELECOMM. UNION, SERIES X: DATA NETWORKS, OPEN SYSTEM COMM.
SECURITY RECOMMENDATION ITU-T X.1205 (2008).

The U.N. General Assembly has adopted several resolutions on internet
7.
privacy and cybersecurity issues. See, e.g., The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age,
Seventy-First Session, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/71/L.39/Rev.1 (Nov. 16, 2016); The Right to
Privacy in the Digital Age, Sixty-Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. A/C.3/69/L.26/Rev.1 (Nov. 19,
2014); G.A. Res. 68/16, The Right to Privacy in the Digital Age (Dec. 18, 2013); G.A. Res.
64/21, Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and Taking Stock of National Efforts
to Protect Critical Information Infrastructures (Mar. 17, 2010); G.A. Res. 58/199,
Creation of a Global Culture of Cybersecurity and the Protection of Critical Information
Infrastructures (Dec. 23, 2003); G.A. Res. 56/12, Combating the Criminal Misuse of
Information Technologies (Jan. 23, 2002); G.A. Res. 55/63, Combating the Criminal
Misuse of Information Technologies (Dec. 4, 2000).
Regional organizations including the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
8.
and Development (OECD) and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) have been
involved in different aspects of internet policymaking. See, e.g., Asia-Pacific Econ. Coop.
[APEC], APEC Privacy Framework (Nov. 2004), http://www.apec.org/Groups/Committeeon-Trade-and-Investment/~/media/Files/Groups/ECSG/05_ecsg privacyframewk.ashx
[https://perma.cc/LQS2-PQT7] (archived Jan. 15, 2019); Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev.
(2014),
Making
Policy
Internet
for
Principles
OECD
[OECD],
https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/oecd-principles-for-internet-policy-making.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BB4Y-VXYS] (archived Jan. 15, 2019) [hereinafter OECD Principles].
See Madeline Carr, Power Plays in Global Internet Governance, 43
9.
MILLENNIUM: J. INT'L STUD. 640, 656-58 (2015); Lauren Movius, The Influence of Global
Civil Society on Internet GovernanceNegotiations, 43 FLA. COMM. J. 1, 1 (2015).
Carr, supra note 9.
10.
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Engineering Task Force (IETF)"I and the Internet Governance Forum
(IGF), and voluntary standards developed by civil society or private
bodies. 12
Despite these obvious differences between international trade law
and internet governance, it would be imprudent to dismiss their
linkage as a matter of mere theoretical interest. Several scholars have
already studied the importance of cross-border data flows to boost the
growth of trade in a digitalised world.13 Good governance of the
internet (such as a high degree of openness, efficiency, and stability)

11.
The IETF circulates memos called Request for Comment (RFCs) which
"contain technical and organizational notes about the Internet." RFCs, INTERNET ENG'G
TASK FORCE, https://www.ietf.org/standards/rfcs/ (last visited Mar. 13, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/S8AR-XTKK] (archived Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter IETF RFCs]. These
memos touch upon different aspects of internet governance, particularly in relation to
technical issues, but may also reflect opinions on policy and user issues. See, e.g.,
Memorandum from S. Hambridge on Netiquette Guidelines (Oct. 1995), https://www.rfceditor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc1855.txt.pdf [https://perma.cc/V29R-AJ2X] (archived Jan. 15,
2019); Memorandum from the Internet Activities Board on Ethics and the Internet (Jan.
1989), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfcl087.pdf [https://perma.cc/FM7A-NLS4] (archived Jan.
15, 2019); Memorandum from T. Dierks & C. Allen on The TLS Protocol (Jan. 1999),
https://www.rfe-editor.org/rfc/pdfrfc/rfc2246.txt.pdf
[https://perma.ccV7ZQ-4DLZI
(archived Jan. 15, 2019).
12.
See, e.g., ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., MANILA PRINCIPLES
INTERMEDIARY LIABiLITY (2015), https://www.eff.org/fles/2015/10/31/manila

ON

principles 1.0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3G85-34A9] (archived Jan. 15, 2019); ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES ON THE APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS
TO COMMUNICATIONS SURVEILLANCE (2013), https://www.eff.org/files/necessaryand

proportionatefinal.pdf [https://perma.cc/4PGP-47W5]

(archived Jan. 15, 2019); GLOB.

NETWORK INITIATIVE, PRINCIPLES ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND PRIVACY (2009),

https://globalnetworkinitiative.org/gin-tnetnoc/uploads/2018/04/GNI-Principles-onFreedom-of-Expression-and-Privacy.pdf [https://perma.cc/5MCR-3Y9E] (archived Jan.
15, 2019) (setting forth principles aimed at advancing freedom of expression and privacy
in the Information and Communications Technology industry); INT'L STANDARDS ORG.,
CODE OF PRACTICE FOR PROTECTION OF PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFO. (PII) IN PUBLIC

CLOUDS ACTING AS PII PROCESSORS (2008), https://www.iso.org/obp/uil#iso:std:isoiec:27018:ed- 1:vl:en [https://perma.cc/YZ7S-9JJX] (archived Jan. 15, 2019).
13.
See, e.g., U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Data Protection
Regulations and International Data Flows: Implications for Trade and Development,
U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/WEB/DTLISTICT/2016/1/iPub (2016); U.S. INT'L TRADE COMM'N,
DIGITAL TRADE

IN THE U.S.

AND

GLOBAL

ECONOMIES:

PART

2

at 65

(2014),

https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4485.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G3AE-PHMY]
(archived Jan. 15, 2019); Susan Stone et al., Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD],
Emerging Policy Issues: LocalisationBarriers to Trade, OECD Trade Policy Papers No.
180 (2015); Joshua Meltzer, The Internet, Cross-Border Data Flows and International
Trade, ISSUES IN TECH. INNOVATION, Feb. 2013, at 1, https://www.brookings.edulwpcontent/uploads/20 16/06/internet-data-and-trade-meltzer.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6538AFW7] (archived Jan. 16, 2019); James Manyika et al., Digital globalization: The new
era
of
global
flows,
McKINSEY
GLOBAL
INST.
(Mar.
2016),
http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/digitalglobalization-the-new-era-of-global-flows [https://perma.cc/Q2XS-M7M5] (archived Jan.
15, 2019).
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facilitates the use of the internet for trade. 14 With the rapid expansion
of the global market for digital services, measures that obstruct the
internet (e.g., restrictions on data flows or imposition of proprietary or
indigenous technical standards) also constitute barriers to trade and,
therefore, may be subject to scrutiny under international trade law.
The relationship between international trade law and internet
15
For
governance is increasingly being explored and evaluated.
Transfor
Agreement
Progressive
and
instance, in the Comprehensive
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), 16 the parties acknowledged the
importance of internet-related policy issues to digital trade and
thereby introduced binding provisions on cross-border flows of
information and data localisation and other disciplines on personal
data protection, spam, online consumer protection, and cybersecurity
cooperation. 17 Further, stakeholders in the. internet governance
community also recognise the significance of international trade
agreements in supporting "a free and open [i]nternet, which is just,
fair, and development oriented and furthers the interoperability of
[i]nternet information services" and its positive ramifications on "social
and economic development."18 However, others have noted the possible
discord between trade rules and internet governance as trade
agreements are used by powerful stakeholders in a secretive manner
to impose internet openness,' 9 without due regard to the regulatory

AND

See HARSHA VARDHAN SINGH ET AL., GOVERNANCE OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE
14.
THE INTERNET: EXISTING AND EVOLVING REGULATORY SYSTEMS 2 (2016),

[https://perma.cc/6CP4https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig-no32web.pdf
RBHB] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
See generally, e.g., Mira Burri, The World Trade Organizationas an Actor in
15.
Global Internet Governance, in THE INSTITUTIONS OF GLOBAL INTERNET GOVERNANCE

(William J. Drake & Mira Burri eds., 2016); Susan Aaronson, Why Trade Agreements are
Not Setting Information Free: The Lost History and Reinvigorated Debate over CrossBorder Data Flows, Human Rights and National Security, 14 WORLD TRADE REV. 676
(2015); Luca Belli & Marilia Marcel, The Quiet Rapprochement of Internet Governance
and Trade Policy, DIPLO (Oct. 14, 2016), https://www.diplomacy.edulblog/quiet[https://perma.cc/Z66G-TBBY]
rapprochement-internet-governance-and-trade-policy
(archived Jan. 15, 2019).
Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership,
16.
Mar. 8, 2018, https://www.mfat.govt.nz/assets/CPTPP/Comprehensive-and-Progressive[https://perma.cc/5CDRAgreement-for-Trans-Pacific-Partnership-CPTPP-English.pdf
V8K6] (archived Feb. 26, 2019) [hereinafter CPTPP].
17.
For discussion of these provisions, see Neha Mishra, The Role of the TransPacific PartnershipAgreement in the Internet Ecosystem: Uneasy Liaison or Synergistic
Alliance?, 20 J. INT'L & ECON. L. 30, 36-55 (2017).
18.
U.N. Internet Governance Forum Dynamic Coalition on Trade & the Internet,
Resolution on Transparency, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Dec. 19, 2017),
https://www.eff.org/files/2017/12/19/igf-dc-trade-resolution-on-transparency.pdf
[https://perma.ccLPL2-LVS2] (archived Jan. 17, 2019).
In Tae Yoo, New Wine into Old Wineskins? Regime Diffusion by the Powerful
19.
from InternationalTrade into Cyberspace, 32 PAC. FOCUS 375, 376 (2017).
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autonomy necessary for domestic regulation of cyberspace.2 0 To date,
trade tribunals have not comprehensively investigated the conflict
between trade and internet policy. 2 1 Therefore, to understand better
how these two fields interface, greater clarity is required regarding
how existing (and future) trade rules can be applied and interpreted in
trade disputes concerning internet and internet-enabled services.
When applying international trade agreements such as the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) 22 to measures
restricting data flows, a delicate balance needs to be struck between
liberalising trade in digital services and preserving domestic policy
goals, including regulating online content in the public interest,
protecting privacy of citizens, and reducing cybercrimes.2 3 Although
such measures are implemented domestically, they have a direct
impact on a globally interconnected network. For example, data
localisation laws may affect how data is routed through the network as
well as the efficiency of cross-border data flows. 24 When examining
such measures under GATS, the assessment will often involve
fundamental issues related to internet governance. For instance, under
GATS Article XIV, a trade tribunal may need to determine the
necessity of a data localisation measure to achieve privacy or
cybersecurity. 2 5 Therefore, even applying international trade law

20.
JANE KELSEY & BuRcu KILLIC, BRIEFING ON US TISA PROPOSAL ON ECOMMERCE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS AND NET NEUTRALITY

15-16 (2014), http://www.world-psi.org/sites/default/files/documents/
research/briefing-on-tisa-e-commerce-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B3BV-QSBV]
(archived Jan. 15, 2019); see also Svetlana Yakoveva & Kristiana Irion, The Best of Both
Worlds? Free Trade in Services, and EU Law on Privacy and Data Protection?, 2 EUR.
DATA PROTECTION L. REV. 191, 202-07 (2016) (describing potential conflicts between the
European Union's regulation of data protection and its obligations under international
trade agreements).
21.
In US-Gambling, the World Trade Organization Appellate Body did not
dismiss the United States' argument that they could regulate online services on public
morals, but rather rejected the measure because it was arbitrary and discriminatory in
nature. See Appellate Body Report, United States-MeasuresAffecting the Cross-Border
Supply of Gamblingand Betting Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS285/AB/R (adopted Apr. 20,
2005) [hereinafter US-Gambling]. In China-Publicationsand Audiovisual Services,
the AB skirted any discussion on China's role in internet censorship. See Appellate Body
Report, China-MeasuresAffecting TradingRights and DistributionServices for Certain
Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS363/ABIR
(adopted Jan. 19, 2010).
22.
General Agreement on Trade in Services, Apr. 15, 1994, Marrakesh
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1B, 1867 U.N.T.S. 154
[hereinafter Marrakesh Agreement].

&

23.
See Andrew Mitchell & Jarrod Hepburn, Don't Fence Me In: Reforming Trade
and Investment Law to Better Facilitate Cross-Border Data Transfer, 19 YALE J.L.
TECH. 182, 201-05 (2017).

24.

See infra Part II.B.

25.
See DANIEL CROSBY, ANALYSIS OF DATA LOCALIZATION MEASURES UNDER
WTO SERVICES TRADE RULES AND COMMITMENTS (2016), http://el5initiative.org/wp-

content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Policy-Brief-Crosby-Final.pdf

[https://perma.ccl9UTK-
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requires clarity regarding the fundamental principles governing data
flows.
This Article argues that three principles of internet governance
are most pertinent to internet data flows: internet openness, internet
security, and internet privacy. Though these terms are frequently used
in internet governance literature, different stakeholders attribute
different meanings to these terms. This Article has defined and
explained each of these principles by distilling and assimilating
important and relevant values and ideas from different soft law
in internet
documents, and scholarship
policy
instruments,
governed
framework"
is
a
"multilayered
governance. Since the internet
require
internet
the
through
transfers
by several institutions, data
of
interoperability
and
stakeholders,
coordination among different
26
principles
The
layers.
different
across
policies and technical protocols
of internet openness, security, and privacy provide important guiding
tools to different stakeholders operating in different layers to ensure
the interoperability and security of data flows. This Article further
explores how these three principles are relevant to international trade
law, particularly if it can contribute to or facilitate achieving these
principles. However, as international trade law is not the appropriate
platform to resolve issues related to human rights, this Article does not
directly evaluate the political connotations of the principles of internet
openness, security, and privacy. For example, measures restricting
data flows cannot be challenged before trade tribunals because they
violate human rights recognised in domestic or international non-trade
27
instruments (e.g., the freedom of expression).
Part 0 explains how measures restricting cross-border data flows
operate in practice as well as the different types of data restrictive
measures with a trade-restrictive effect. Part 0 focuses on three key
principles in internet governance instrumental to data flows-internet
openness, security, and privacy-arguing that these principles are
complementary in nature. Part 0 evaluates the extent to which these
three principles align with rules in international trade law, as well as
how they can be used in context of applying, interpreting, and

HJUJ] (archived Jan. 16, 2019); Susannah Hodson, Applying WTO and FTA Disciplines
to Data Localization Measures, WORLD TRADE REV. 1-29 (2018); Carla L. Reyes, WTOCompliant Protection of FundamentalRights: Lessons from the EU Privacy Directive, 12
MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 1, 24-25 (2011).
JOHN PALFREY & URs GASSER, INTEROP: THE PROMISE AND PERLS OF HIGHLY
26.
INTERCONNECTED SYSTEMS 5-6 (2012); ROLF H. WEBER, LEGAL INTEROPERABILITY AS A
TOOL FOR COMBATTING FRAGMENTATION (2014), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/

files/gcig-paperno4.pdf [https://perma.cc/PPF8-Z8UK] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 22, Annex 2, art. 7.1,; see also Joost
27.
Pauwelyn, SquaringFree Trade in Culture with Chinese Censorship:The WTO Appellate
Body Report on China-Audiovisuals, 11 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 119, 132-33 (2008)
(describing how the WTO Appellate Body found China's censorship policies did not
violate GATT without even mentioning the possibility that China was violating the right
to free speech).
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reforming international trade law. Part V discusses the possibility of
bringing together the multilateral approach of international trade law
with the multistakeholder approach in internet governance with
regard to regulating cross-border data flows. The Article concludes that
given the growing importance of digital trade, international trade law
should not be isolated from internet governance. Understanding the
linkages between the two fields is timely and crucial to: (i) ensure a
more meaningful role for trade disciplines in addressing digital trade
issues such as cross-border data flows; and (ii) build a comprehensive
and balanced approach to govern cross-border data flows at the global
level.

II. UNDERSTANDING

MEASURES RESTRICTING CROSS-BORDER DATA

FLOWS

The internet is a multilayered technology consisting of a physical
layer containing the physical infrastructure-carrying data packets; the
network layer consisting of routing protocols that determine the path
of data packets; the transport layer consisting of protocols that ensure
sequencing and delivery of data packets (e.g., the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP)); and finally, the applications layer consisting of the
programmes that users see while using the internet. 28 These different
layers should be interoperable to enable data flows through the
internet. 29 This Part addresses what constitutes "data" and "crossborder data flows" along with explaining the different types of
measures restricting data flows.
A. The "Restrictive"Element of "Cross-BorderData Flows"
1. Types of Data
Data flows are intrinsic to all digital services. For example, using
an electronic commerce platform can involve a "complex web of data
flows" between servers of different services (e.g., e-payment services,

28.

WILLIAM J. DRAKE ET AL., INTERNET FRAGMENTATION: AN OVERVIEW 13

(2016); see also YOcHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 396, 412-13, 439 (2006);
Jose MA. Emmanuel A. Caral, Lessons from ICANN: Is Self-Regulation of the Internet
Fundamentally Flawed?, 12 INT'L J.L. & TECH. 1, 1, 9-13 (2012); Memorandum from
Internet Architecture Board on Technical Considerations for Internet Service Blocking
and
Filtering
12
(Mar.
2016),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc7754.pdf
[https://perma.cc/KSX4-4Q46] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); Memorandum from R. Braden on
Requirements for Internet Hosts-Communication Layers 8-9 (Oct. 1989),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfcll22.pdf [https://perma.cclLS8P-HYEB] (archived Feb. 5,
2019).
29.
PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 26, at 5.
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30
the e-commerce portal) and the customer's computer or digital device.
Here, "data" (contained in data packets transferred through the
internet) refers to both the digitised content in the service as well as
the data generated when users access or use digital services,
applications, and websites. Thus, "data flows," as used in this Article,
refers to both the provision of the digital service itself (as it is encoded
in bits and bytes) and the data flows generated while using a service,
such as business data or user-generated data.31
Some scholars compartmentalise data into different categories,
suggest that different categories necessitate
and, further,
differentiated treatment. For example, Nivedita Sen classifies data
into personal data, referring to data related to individuals; company
data, referring to data flowing between corporations; business data,
referring to digitised content such as software and audiovisual content;
and social data, referring to behavioural patterns determined using
personal data.32 Susan Ariel Aaronson and Patrick Leblond categorise
data into personal data, public data, confidential business data,
machine-to-machine data, and metadata, although they do not
specifically define each of these terms.3 3 Usually, personal data and
confidential business data are protected more strongly in most
34
domestic laws than anonymised and day-to-day business data.
In practice, varied legal treatment of data categories is difficult to
implement due to the overlapping nature of data categories. First,
personal data and other types of data (non-personal data) cannot
always be neatly distinguished in practice; for example, big data
35
technologies can help identify individuals in anonymised datasets.
Similarly, metadata combined with geolocation technologies can be

Nivedita Sen, Understanding the Role of the WTO in InternationalData
30.
Flows: Taking the Liberalizationor the Regulatory Autonomy Path, 21 J. INT'L ECON. L.
323, 323-24 (2018).
W. KUAN HON, DATA LOCALIZATION LAWS AND POLICY 72 (2017); AMY PORGES
31.
& ALICE ENDERS, DATA MOVING ACROSS BORDERS: THE FUTURE OF DIGITAL TRADE

http://el5initiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/E15-Digital1
(2016),
POLICY
Economy-Porges-and-Enders-Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/M78G-B9ZN] (archived Jan.
16, 2019).
Sen, supra note 30, at 22.
32.
Susan Ariel Aaronson & Patrick Leblond, Another Digital Divide: The Rise of
33.
DataRealms and Its Implications for the WTO, 2 J. INT'L ECON. L. 1, 5-6 (2018).
For example, in a proposed regulatory framework for cross-border flows of
34.
non-personal data, the European Commission established a fairly liberal system of selfregulation combined with a principles-based approach for non-personal data flows in the
Digital Single Market while continuing to have very stringent standards for personal
data processing. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council on a Framework for the Free Flow of Non-PersonalData in the European Union,
pmbl., art. 7, COM (2017) 495 final (Sept. 13, 2017).
Ira S. Rubinstein, Big Data: The End of Privacy or a New Beginning?, 3 INT'L
35.
DATA PRIVACY L. 74, 78 (2013).
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used to identify intimate details of an individual's life. 36 Further,
personal data may be a component of business or company data-for
example, employee records. Second, personal data does not only have
social value but also business value, as it is traded via various digital
services and drives the digital economy.3 7 In fact, 75 percent of digital

data today is generated by internet users, and largely falls within the
scope of personal data.38 Thus, limiting data flows to non-personal data
will not be meaningful or sufficient for enabling digital services.
Finally, certain policy concerns are common to both categories of data;
for example, data security concerns affect both personal and nonpersonal data.
2. Cross-Border versus Domestic Data Flows
The global, interconnected, and instantaneous nature of data
flows through the internet obfuscates the distinction between crossborder and domestic data flows. Data flows are driven by protocols that
determine the most efficient path for internet traffic without
consideration of geographical boundaries.3 9 In cloud computing,
typically, data packets are broken down into smaller chunks, which are
stored and routed through multiple servers to ensure data security
(this process is called sharding). 40 Further, even if data is finally stored
in one server, data usually transits through multiple servers across
countries during routine processing.4 1 Thus, regulating data flows
based on territorial boundaries (for example, data should be stored,
processed, and routed through one's borders) is both counterintuitive
and inefficient.
However, when applying international trade to measures that
regulate cross-border data flows, the physical locations of the data, the

36.

Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 2/2017 on Data

Processingat Work, at 10 (June 8, 2017), http://ec.europa.eulnewsroom/document.cfm?

doc-id=45631 [https://perma.cc/46D2-NECA] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
37.
See Svetlana Yakovieva, Should Fundamental Rights to Privacy and Data
Protection be a Part of the EU's InternationalTrade 'Deals?,17 WORLD TRADE REV. 477,

478 (2018) (recognizing that personal data can be viewed as both "a trade commodity and
as an asset with societal value").
38.
TIM COOPER & RYAN LASALLE, GUARDING AND GROWING PERSONAL DATA
VALUE 10 (2016), https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-4/Accenture-Guarding-

and-Growing-Personal-Data-Value-POV-Low-Res.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4TBR-MKNJ]
(archived Jan. 16, 2019).
39.
Rus Schuler, How Does the Internet Work?, STANFORD (2002), https://web.sta
nford.edulclass/msande91silwwwsprO4/readings/weekl/InternetWhitepaper.htm [httzp
s://perma.cc/492G-YUP4] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
40.
Jeeyoung Kim, How Sharding Works, MEDIUM (Dec. 6, 2014),
https://medium.com/@jeeyoungk/how-sharding-works-b4dec46b3f6 [https://perma.cc/N4
YV-8ZH7] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
41.
KUAN HON, supra note 31, at 74-76.
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supplier, and the internet user are relevant to determine if there is
42
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B. Types of Data Restrictive Measures
Measures restricting data flows can affect different layers of the
internet. Certain measures directly affect the physical or transport
layer of the internet. For example, the Chinese government reportedly
exercises enormous control over the physical infrastructure through
which internet traffic is exchanged (or Internet Exchange Points) to
prevent circulation of banned or offensive online content in Chinese
cyberspace. 4 3 Similarly, a data localisation measure requiring local
routing would interfere with transfer protocols that route internet
traffic based on efficiency rather than geographic location. Other
restrictive measures do not directly interfere with the technical or
of the network, but impose specific
physical infrastructure
providers, for instance, by imposing
service
digital
requirements on
to privacy or cybersecurity that
related
conditional requirements
are offered. 44
services
digital
these
how
affect
might
Cross-border data flows can be restricted in various ways from
blocking data flows through internet outages or deliberate attacks on
45
the Domain Name System to more specific measures such as data

Cross-border supply of digital services occurs through four modes: Mode 1
42.
("from the territory of one Member into the territory of any other Member"), Mode 2 ("in
the territory of one Member to the service consumer of any other Member"), Mode 3 ("by
a service supplier of one Member, through commercial presence in the territory of any
other Member" and Mode 4 ("by a service supplier of one Member, through presence of
natural persons of a Member in the territory of any other Member"). See Marrakesh
Agreement, supra note 22, art. 1(2).
Nikhil Sonnad & Keith Collins, How Countrieslike China and Russia are Able
43.
2016),
5,
(Oct.
POINTS
CHOKE
QUARTZ:
Internet,
Control the
to
https://qz.com/780675/how-do-internet-censorship-and-surveillance-actually-work/
[https://perma.cc/8S7K-FCWZ] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
For example, the GDPR only allows transfer of data to those countries which
44.
have met an adequacy requirement or where the service providers provide other
additional undertakings regarding data transfers such as the use of Binding Corporate
Rules and Standard Contractual Clauses.
The Domain Name System or DNS is "a database that stores all of the
45.
domain names and corresponding IP numbers for a particular top-level domain (TLD)
such as .com or .net. See What is DNS (DomainName System)?, VERISIGN,
https://www.verisign.comlenUS/website-presence/online/domain-namesystemlindex.xhtml (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/TZ9G-2N93] (archived
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localisation. Additionally, service providers can use tools such as geoblocking to limit their services to specific countries. Martina Ferracane
classifies restrictions on cross-border data flows into two categories:
"strict" and "conditional." 46 Strict restrictions on cross-border data
flows include local storage requirements, 4 7 local storage and processing
requirements, 4 8 and bans on data transfer 4 9 (i.e., local storage, local
processing, and local access requirements).5 0 Such measures are
typically termed as data localisation measures.5 ' Conditional
restrictions consist of measures where data flows are allowed subject
to conditions imposed on the recipient country or the data
controller/processor. 52 In practice, a measure may incorporate both
strict and conditional restrictions. For example, the Russian data
localisation law requires local storing and processing,5 3 but also allows

&

Jan. 16, 2019). The DNS identifies and locates computer systems and resources on the
Internet. See id.
46.
Martina F. Ferracane, Restrictions on Cross-borderData Flows: A Taxonomy.
4 (European Ctr. for Int'l. Pol. Econ. Working Paper 1/2017, 2017), https://ecipe.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/1 1/Restrictions-on-cross-border-data-flows-a-taxonomy-finall .pdf
[https://perma.ce/R5QP-7WW7] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
47.
See, e.g., Federal'nyi Zakon o Vnesenii Izmenenii V Otdel;nyye
Zakonodatel'nyye Akty Rossiiskoy Federatsii V Chasti Utochneniya Poryadka
Obrabotki Personal'nykh Dannykh V Informatsionno-Telekommunikatisonnykh
Setyakh [Federal Law on Amending Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation
in as much as it Concerns Updating the Procedure for Personal Data Processing in
Information-Telecommunications Networks], FEDERAL'NYI ZAKON [FZ] [Federal Law]
2014, No. 242-FZ, art. 2 (Rus.).
48.
The EU defines data processing to include data storage. See W. Kuan Hon et
al., Policy, Legal and Regulatory Implications of a Europe-only Cloud, 24 INTL J.L.
INFO. TECH. 251, 259 (2016).
49.
See, e.g., Law on Payment and Security Settlement Systems, Payment
Services and Electronic Money Institutions, Turkish Civil Code, Law No.: 6493 art. 23
[R.G.], 20 June 2013; Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.B.C.
1996, s 30.1 (Can.); Personal Information International Disclosure Protection Act, N.S.
2006, s 5 (Can.).
50.
Ferracane, supra note 46, at 4.
51.
However, Chander and Le define data localisation more broadly to include
any measure "that specifically encumber(s) the transfer of data across national borders,"
thus including both de jure and de facto measures. Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Data
Nationalism, 64 EMORY L.J. 677, 680 (2015); see also Mitchell & Hepburn, supra note
23, at 188-95.
52.
Ferracane, supra note 46, at 5.
53.
Federal'nyi Zakon o Vnesenii Izmenenii V Otdel;nyye Zakonodatel'nyye
Akty Rossiiskoy Federatsii V Chasti Utochneniya Poryadka Obrabotki Personal'nykh
Dannykh V Informatsionno-Telekommunikatisonnykh Setyakh [Federal Law on
Amending Some Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation in as much as it Concerns
Updating the Procedure for Personal Data Processing in InformationTelecommunications Networks], FEDERAL'NYI ZAKON [FZ] [Federal Law] 2014, No. 242FZ, art. 2 (Rus.).
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conditional data transfer to countries that meet certain international
standards.54

Measures restricting data flows can also be examined in light of
the nature of the measure and its underlying objective. Certain
measures restrict data flows based on the nature or content of the
digital service and underlying data flows-for example, preventing
supply of digital services that contain politically or culturally sensitive
or banned content.5 5 Another tool used by China to ensure a clean
internet environment in the country is restricting the supply of Virtual
56
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and/or secured from unauthorised intrusion such as data localization
measures.5 8 Here, the primary policy rationale behind the datarestrictive measure is to protect the privacy of individuals or the
security of data or the network. One example of the same is the General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) of the European Union, which
imposes various conditions on data controllers and processors in course
59
of processing and transferring personal data of EU residents. In order
to achieve compliance with this regulation, several foreign service

Federal'nyi Zakon o Zashchite Personal'nykh Dannykh [Federal Law on Data
54.
Protection, FEDERAL'NYI ZAKON [FZ] [Federal Law] 2006, No. 152-FZ, arts. 3.1, 12.
See, e.g., Singapore Internet Code of Practice, art. 4, Nov. 1, 1997,
55.
https://www.imda.gov.sg/-/media/imda/files/regulation-licensing-and-consultations/
content-and-standards-classification/video-games/policiesandcontentguidelinesinternet-internecodeofpractice.pdf91a=en [https://perma.cc/64ZU-PXWE] (archived Feb.
5, 2019); see also Computer Information Network and Internet Security, Protection and
Management (promulgated by Ministry Pub. Sec., Dec. 30, 1997), arts. 4-6,
http://www.lehmanlaw.com/resource-centrellaws-and-regulations/ information-technolo
gy/computer-information-network-and-internet-security-protection-and-managementregulations-1997.html (China) [https://perma.cclK7T8-QBCC] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
MIIT Notice on Cleaning Up and Regulating the Internet Access Service
56.
Market (issued by Ministry of Indus. & Info. Tech., Jan. 17, 2017),
54 7
37
2 3
1946/content.html
http://www.miit.gov.cn/n1146295/nl652858/nl65 9 0/n 57020/c
[https://perma.cc/9YSC-NFAX] (archived Feb. 5, 2019) (China).
See Julia Yoon, South Korean Data Localization: Shaped by Conflict, UNIV.
57.
WASH,
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INTL

STUD.
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28,

2018),

https://jsis.washington.edulnews/south-korean-data-localization-shaped-conflict/
[https://perma.cc/3WF6-GRD8] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
See Chander & Le, supra note 51 (defining data localization measures).
58.
See generally Regulation 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the
59.
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing
Directive 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation), 2016 O.J. (L 119) [hereinafter
EU Data Protection Regulation].
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providers have had to relocate or build new data centers in the EU. 60
Another example is the Russian data localization law, which, as per
experts, will result in a significant increase in compliance costs for
foreign cloud suppliers while providing a major boost to the domestic
cloud industry. 61 Thus, in practice, measures restricting data flows can
have more than one policy rationale, including a hidden protectionist
intent. 62 This Part explored the various types of data restrictive
measures and the multiple policy rationales informing them. Given the
complexity of data restrictive measures, and the ambiguity in the
regulatory framework governing data flows, significant challenges
exist in identifying protectionist or excessive data restrictions from
legitimate ones. The next part of the Article builds further on this
debate by identifying and explaining the principles of internet
governance that can be applied to regulation of data flows.

III. INTERNET GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES UNDERLYING DATA FLOWS

This Part identifies the source and content of the fundamental
principles in internet governance that apply to data flows. This Article
terms these three fundamental principles as internetopenness, internet
security, and internetprivacy. These three principles are presented as
informative and aspirational tools rather than fixed thresholds, thus
acknowledging that openness and security of the internet network are
matters of degree. 63 Examples are also provided of how different

60.
See, e.g., Maria Korolov, It's Cool, It's Well Wired, and It's Staying in the EU,
DATA CTR. KNOWLEDGE (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.datacenterknowledge.com/europe/
it-s-cool-it-s-well-wired-and-it-s-staying-eu [https://perma.cc/PDB5-6YSF] (archived
Jan. 16, 2019).
61.
Leonid Ragozin & Michael Riley, Putin Is Building Great Russian Firewall,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 26, 2016, 8:00 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/

news/articles/2016-08-26/putin-is-building-a-great-russian-firewall
[https://perma.cc/X9AY-8YUN] (archived Jan. 16, 2019); Jason Verge, Firms Rethink
Russian Data Center Strategy, as Data Sovereignty Law Nears Activation, DATA CTR.
KNOWLEDGE (July 21, 2015), http://www.datacenterknowledge.com/archives/
2015/07/2 1/russian-data-localization-law-spurs-data-center-strategy-changes
[https://perma.cc/5C5E-X6A3] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
62.
Jonah Force Hill, A Balkanized Internet? The UncertainFuture of Global
Internet Standards, GEO. J. INT'L AFF., 49, 49 (2012).
63.
Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Comm. on Dig. Econ. Policy, Economic
and Social Benefits of Internet Openness, at 15, DSTI/ICCP (2015)17/FINAL (June 2,
2016) https://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publiedisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/
ICCP(2015)17/FINAL&docLanguage=En [https://perma.cc/M9FT-U3LH] (archived Jan.
16, 2019) [hereinafter OECD Internet Openness]; see also DRAKE, supra note 28, at 10;
INTERNET Soc'Y, UNDERSTANDING SECURITY AND RESILIENCE OF THE INTERNET 3 (2013),

https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/bp-securityandresilience20130711.pdf [https://perma.cclRL4J-7PZD] (archived Jan. 16, 2019) [hereinafter
INTERNET SOC'Y].
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stakeholders implement these principles in practice. Finally, this Part
argues that the principles of internet openness, security, and privacy
operate as complementary and interdependent principles. In other
words, these three principles need to be implemented simultaneously
to achieve balance, coherence, and predictability in the regulation of
data flows. Principles of internet openness, security, and privacy often
have strong human rights and political connotations. For example,
internet openness is often considered synonymous with freedom of
expression in an online context; 64 internet security is linked to national
security and prevention of cyberwarfare; 65 and internet privacy is
66
linked to observance of due process and human rights.
The discussion below alludes to the global and multistakeholder
nature of the internet. However, individual governments implement
laws and regulations on the internet and cross-border data flows based
on their domestic policy objectives, which may or may not align with
principles of internet openness, security, and privacy. Where this
conflict exists, the global framework for data flows becomes
fragmented, causing disruption to different kinds of economic and
social activities conducted through the internet.
A. The Principle of Internet Openness
1. Internet Openness Requires Free Flow of Data
The essence of the principle of internet openness is the "global free
flow of data across the network" without unnecessary disruptions or
controls.6 7 In other words, the higher the degree of openness of the
internet, the more easily and efficiently data packets are exchanged by
devices connected to the network. The principle of internet openness
can be linked to the fundamental nature of the internet (i.e., an open

Laura DeNardis, One Internet:An Evidentiary Basis for Policy Making on
64.
Internet Universality and Fragmentation, in GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET
GOVERNANCE 4-5 (Ctr. for Int'l Governance Innovation & Chatham House, Paper Ser.
No. 37, July 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig-no.38_web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GB7E-H9H5] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
See, e.g., Permanent Reps. of China, the Russian Federation, Tajikistan, and
65.
Uzbekistan, Letter dated Sept. 12, 2011 from the Permanent Reps. of China, the Russian
Federation, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan to the United Nations addressed to the SecretaryGeneral, U.N. Doc. A/66/359 (Sept. 14, 2011).
U.N. Internet Governance Forum, 8th Internet Governance Forum, Focus
66.
Session: Internet Governance Principles (Oct. 23, 2013) http://www.intgovforum.org/
multilingual/content/focus-session-internet-governance-principles
[https://perma.cclX9W2-MD4J] (archived Feb. 24, 2019).
Sarah Box, Internet Openness and Fragmentation: Toward Measuring the
67.
Economic Effects, in GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 1 (Ctr. for Int'l

Governance Innovation & Chatham House, Paper Ser. No. 36, May 2016),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/gcig-no.36_Web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZVS6-3D9H] (archived Jan. 16, 2019); see also OECD Internet
Openness, supra note 63, at 12.
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and global network working on the architectural principles of
"efficiency" and "non-discrimination").68 Engineers refer to this
architecture as the end-to-end principle in which "information pushed
into one end of the internet should come out the other without
modification," thus ensuring seamless connectivity. 6 9 In other words,
the internet transfers information through the most efficient route, but
the routing protocols do not "know" anything about the content of the
data packets, and hence "cannot by architecture . . . discriminate or

differentiate traffic generated by different applications." 70 Put
differently, the internet is nothing but a "big, fat, dumb, digital pipe," 7 1
with the applications residing at the ends of the network possessing
the intelligence to process the content of the data packets.7 2 The two
primary consequences of this end-to-end architecture are "protection of
innovation" and "provision of reliability and robustness."7 3
The principle of internet openness is often confused with the
concept of net neutrality.74 Since the open architecture of the internet
is based on an end-to-end design, the concepts of internet openness and
net neutrality are interlinked but not identical. Net neutrality is
related to competition conditions within domestic markets such as
preventing broadband providers from blocking specific services or
devices, slowing down the speed of specific types of internet traffic
(throttling), or favouring certain types of internet traffic such as those
belonging to their affiliates or for money (paid prioritisation).7 5 Net
neutrality contributes to internet openness as it prevents arbitrary and

68.
GCIG ONE INTERNET, supra note 1, at vi.
69.
Simson Garfinkel, The End ofEnd-to-End?, MIT TECH. REV. (July 1, 2003),
https://www.technologyreview.com/s/401966/the-end-of-end-to-end/
[https://perma.cc/CHN5-L8QH] (archived Jan. 16, 2019); see also Memorandum from
Brian Carpenter on Architectural Principles of the Internet 2 (June 1996),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfcl958.pdf [https://perma.cc/GC3J-SWUM] (archived Feb. 5,
2019); Memorandum from J. Kempf & R. Austein on The Rise of the Middle and the
Future of End-to-End: Reflections on the Evolution of the Internet Architecture (Mar.
2004), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3724.pdf [https://perma.cc/GHH9-WG4G] (archived
Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter Memorandum from J. Kempf]. But see Anthony Rutkowski,
Weaponizing the Internet Using the "End-to-endPrinciple"Myth, CIRCLEID (Nov. 12,
2017), http://www.circleid.com/posts/20171112_weaponizing theinternet-using the
end to-end principle-myth/ [https://perma.cclP4UTR-5YWI] (archived Jan. 16, 2019).
70.
Lawrence B. Solum, Models of Internet Governance,
GOVERNANCE: INFRASTRUCTURE AND INSTITUTIONS 48, 63-64 (2009).
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Solum, supra note 70, at 58.
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INTERNET 8 (2002); Memorandum from J. Kempf, supra note 69, at 8.
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(last
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Mar.
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FOR NET NEUTRALITY (2002).

75.

Restoring Internet Freedom, supra note 74.
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discriminatory blocking of digital services.76 Conversely, an open
internet enables internet users to "make their own choices about
applications and services to use and which lawful content they want to
77
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access, create, or share with others,"
is much broader
openness
of
internet
concept
the
However,
neutrality.
rather than
global
of
the
to
openness
as
it
relates
neutrality
than net
the domestic network.
The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD) refers to two additional facets of internet openness: economic
78
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openness and social openness.
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put
and
their economic opportunities
Economic openness is determined by several factors such as the degree
of competition and the availability and pricing of internet services in
particular markets.8 0 Governments often protect their domestic digital
sectors by placing restrictions on internet services through various
means such as data localisation, the imposition of indigenous technical
81
standards, geo-restrictions, or foreign internet services bans. Social
openness refers to the nonpecuniary opportunities arising out of
internet openness, including keeping in touch with people, accessing
82
information, and expressing ideas on topics of interest.
2. Free Flow of Information Is Recognised Internationally
Several declarations and soft law instruments recognise the
83
importance of the free flow of information. "Free flow of information"
is the core idea of internet openness-data should be able to flow across

OECD Internet Openness, supranote 63, at 24.
76.
Susan Ariel Aaronson & Rob Maxim, Trade and the Internet: Policies in the
77.
US, the EU and Canada, in HANDBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL POLITIcAL ECONOMY OF
TRADE 550, 551 (2014).
See OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 24.
78.
Id.
79.
80.
Id.
81.
GCIG ONE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 52.
OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 16.
82.
83.
World Summit on Info. Soc'y, Tunis Agenda for the Information Society,
WSIS-05/TUNIS[DOC/6(Rev. 1)-E (Nov. 18, 2005), http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/does2/
tunis/off/6revl.html [https://perma.cc/GR24-4NVG] (archived Jan. 16, 2019) [hereinafter
Tunis Agenda]; World Summit on Info. Soc'y, Declarationof Principles - Building the
Information Society: A Global Challenge in the New Millennium, WSIS(Dec. 12, 2003) http://www.itu.int/net/wsis/docs/480ecogn/
03/GENEVA/DOC/4-E
official/dop.html [https://perma.cc/5TEW-MXJA] (archived Jan. 16, 2019). Free flow of
information is recognised as a human right in many treaties. See G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI),
art. 19, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Mar. 23, 1976) (only
binding on signatories); G.A. Res. 217, art. 19, Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(Dec. 10, 1948) (not binding, but some scholars recognise it as customary international
law); see also Lisa J Damon, Freedom of Information versus National Sovereignty: The
Need for a New Global Forum for the Resolution of TransborderDataFlow Problems, 10
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 262, 268-71 (1986).
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the network without unnecessary or unreasonable disruptions. 84
However, a completely open and free internet, as discussed below, is
neither desirable nor technically feasible. The Internet Society refers
to different aspects of internet openness as "internet invariants" (or
fundamental, unchanging features of the internet): (i)"the global reach
and integrity" of the internet that is preserved through "end-to-end
architecture" of the internet network; (ii) "universal accessibility"; (iii)
"permission-less innovation," enabling digital entrepreneurship and
unhindered innovation on the internet; and (iv) "inter-networking" via
"open standards, enabling transparency in standard-setting." 85
Several intergovernmental bodies have recognised internet
openness in different declarations and policy recommendations. In
2011, the G8 group of countries adopted the Deauville Declaration,
which supports "openness, transparency and freedom of the [i]nternet"
and "non-discrimination and fair competition" on the internet. 8 6 The
OECD recognises that "promot[ing] and protect[ing] the global free
flow of information," "promot[ing] the open, distributed and
interconnected nature of the [i]nternet," and "promot[ing] and
enabl[ing] the cross-border delivery of services" are fundamental
principles of internet policymaking.8 7 The OECD reaffirmed these
principles in the 2016 Cancun Declaration.8 8 One of the founding
principles
of
internet
governance
in
the
NETMundial
Multistakeholder Statement was the free flow of information,
acknowledging that internet users have the "right to access, share,
create and distribute information on the internet, consistent with the
rights of authors and creators."89 Various bilateral statements have
also expressed support for the principle of internet openness.9 0

84.
Box, supra note 67.
85.
Internet Invariants: What Really Matters, INTERNET Soc'Y (Feb. 3, 2012),
https://www.internetsociety.org/internet-invariants-what-really-matters/
[https://perma.cc/B5MG-GRF3] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); see also DRAKE, supra note 28,
at 12, 20.
86.
G8 Declaration, Renewed Commitment for Freedom and Democracy, art. 2,
T 9 (May 26-27, 2011), https://www.nato.int/nato-static fl2014/assets/pdflpdf 2011 05/
20110926 110526-G8-Summit-Deauville.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPJ2-NBJG] (archived
Jan. 19, 2019).
87.
OECD Principles,supra note 8, at 5-8.
88.
Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], Ministerial Declarationon the Digital
Economy (June 21-23, 2016), https://www.oecd.org/internet/Digital-EconomyMinisterial-Declaration-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TXR-RKS2] (archived Jan. 19,
2019) [hereinafter Cancin Declaration].
89.
NETmundial Multistakeholder Statement, NETMUNDLAL (Apr. 24, 2014),
http://netmundial.br/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/NETmundial-MultistakeholderDocument.pdf [https://perma.cc/2FKX-54NM] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
90.
See, e.g., Japan-United States Trade Principles for Information and
Communication Technology Services, Japan-U.S., Jan. 27, 2012,
http://www.soumu.go.jp/main-content/000143845.pdf [https://perma.cc/4R6Q-QTM9]
(archived Jan. 19, 2019); European Union-United States Trade Principles for
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However, not all countries support internet openness with the
same level of enthusiasm. For instance, countries such as Russia and
China have repeatedly asserted sovereign control over the free flow of
information to block or filter information that could be harmful to the
cultural or moral ethos of the country or for purposes of national
security.9 1 This idea of national sovereignty in cyberspace (or cyber
sovereignty) entails governments regulating the internet and the
multistakeholder community playing only a secondary role.
3. Implementing Principle of Internet Openness
The flow of data packets requires openness and interoperability
across different layers of the internet.9 2 For example, technical
protocols and standards (such as routing protocols) and application
software should be interoperable with each other to facilitate internet
openness. An integrated and universal IP address system (Domain
Name System or DNS) is essential for accuracy, transparency, and
93
efficiency in data flows through the internet. Further, in order to
facilitate internet openness, commercial digital services should be built
on transparent and interoperable standards to ensure that customers
can access and use different digital services. 94 To the contrary, the use
of closed or proprietary standards or platforms reduces internet

Information and Communication Technology Services, E.U.-U.S., Apr. 4, 2011,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/april/tradoc_147780.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7TUH-5WCC] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
Paul R. Burgman, Securing Cyberspace: China Leading the Way in Cyber
91.
Sovereignty, THE DIPLOMAT (May 18, 2016), https://thediplomat.com/2016/05/securingcyberspace-china-leading-the-way-in-cyber-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cclPW4U-YS35]
(archived Jan. 19, 2019); China internet:Xi Jinpingcalls for 'cyber sovereignty', BBC
(Dec. 16, 2015), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-35109453
[https://perma.cc/SDP6-GS87] (archived Jan. 19, 2019); Alexander Gabuev, How China
and Russia see the internet, WORLD ECON. FORUM (Dec. 16, 2015),
https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/12/how-china-and-russia-see-the-internet/
[https://perma.cc/CB4H-GUQX] (archived Jan. 19, 2019); Bruce Sterling, Respecting
Chinese and Russian Cyber-Sovereignty in the Formerly Global Internet, WIRED (Dec.
22, 2015, 8:06 AM), https://www.wired.com/beyond-the-beyond/2015/12/respectingchinese-and-russian-cyber-sovereignty-in-the-formerly-global-internet/
[https://perma.cc/HJ3E-PQ25] (archived Jan. 19, 2019); Zhu Yuan, No absolute free
flow of information, CHINA DAILY (Jan. 26, 2010), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/
opinion/2010-01/26/content_9380067.htm [https://perma.ccfU8LF-AVF5] (archived Jan.
19, 2019).
See DeNardis, supra note 64, at 4-5; PALFREY & GASSER, supra note 26
92.
(interoperability refers to "the ability to transfer and render useful data and other
information across systems, applications, or components"); see also Rolf W. Weber,
Legal Interoperabilityas a Tool for Combatting Fragmentation,in GLOBAL COMMISSION
ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE (Ctr. for Int'l Governance Innovation & Chatham House,

Paper Ser. No. 37, July 2016).
OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 1,
93.
See, e.g., GRACE A. LEWIS, THE ROLE OF STANDARDS IN CLOUD-COMPUTING
94.
INTEROPERABILITY 18-19 (2012).
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openness.95 For example, certain digital services may not function on
closed platforms because their technical codes are incompatible with
those of the platform.
Although internet openness is desirable, a completely open
internet is considered suboptimal for various reasons. 96 First, the
variations in culture, language, and censorship as well as access to
internet infrastructure across countries make it infeasible to construct
a completely unified internet.9 7 Second, a certain degree of
fragmentation may be necessary for greater security or setting up
business operations such as firewalls and VPN services.98 Nonetheless,
a majority of the vulnerabilities and flaws arising from the open
architecture are better addressed by technical solutions including endto-end encryption rather than closing off the network. 99
Internet openness also relates to transparency, both at a technical
and regulatory level; thus, the necessity of measures restricting
internet openness and their underlying rationale should be properly
assessed by governments, the internet technical community, and
technology companies. The IETF has recommended a separate code "to
provide transparency in circumstances where issues of law or public
policy affect server operations."1 00 This transparency is important as
measures affecting internet openness often interfere with the seamless
architecture of the internet; for example, an internet censorship
measure could harm the integrity of the DNS.1 0 1 Dennis Broeders
terms the main protocols and infrastructure, including the DNS, as the
"public core of the internet." 102 When imposing restrictions on internet

95.
DeNardis, supra note 64, at 9; OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 5.
96.
ORG. FOR ECON. Coop. & DEv. [OECD], OECD DIGITAL ECONOMY OUTLOOK
2015 73-74 (2015), https://ec.europa.euleurostat/documents/42577/3222224/
Digital+economy+ outlook+2015/dbdec3c6-ca38-432c-82f2-le330d9d6a24
[https://perma.cc/P7RX-3TRV] (archived Feb. 6, 2019) [hereinafter OECD DIGITAL
ECONOMY]; Christopher S. Yoo, When Are Two Networks Better Than One? Toward a
Theory of Optimal Fragmentation,in GLOBAL COMMISSION ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE

1 (Ctr. for Int'l Governance Innovation & Chatham House, Paper Ser. No. 36, June
2016); Box, supranote 67; Wolfgang Kerber & Heike Schweitzer, Interoperabilityin the
DigitalAge, 8 J. INTELL. PROP., INFO. TECH. & ELECTRONIC COM. L., 39, 42 (2017).
97.
Laura DeNardis, Five DestabilizingTrends in Internet Governance, 12 I/S: A
J.L. & POL'Y INFO. Soc'Y 133, 127 (2015) [hereinafter DeNardis Destabilizing].
98.
DeNardis, supra note 64, at 9.
99.
CLARK, supra note 73, at 8.
100. Memorandum from Tim Bray on An HTTP Status Code to Report Legal
Obstacles (Feb. 2016), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc7725.pdf [https://perma.cc/4HEPAQ6V] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
101. Joanna Kulesza & Rolf H. Weber, Protecting the Public Core of the Internet,
in GLOBAL COMMISSION ON THE STABILITY OF CYBERSPACE 77 (The Hague Ctr. for

Strategic Studies, GCSC Issue Brief No. 1, Nov. 2017).
102. DENNIS BROEDERS, THE PUBLIC CORE OF THE INTERNET: AN INTERNATIONAL
AGENDA FOR INTERNET GOVERNANCE 13 (2016).
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openness, governments or the private sector should remain cautious
when the said measure affects this core architecture of the network.
Finally, internet openness does not imply that governments
cannot regulate digital services on legitimate public policy groundsfor example, to prevent circulation of racist content or child
pornography.1 0 3 However, internet users should be clearly made aware
of the specific reasons for being denied access to a specific digital
service. Similarly, governments should be transparent and objective in
implementing their laws and regulations such that private sectors can
have legal certainty regarding how domestic laws apply to political or
sociocultural online content. Thus, as Laura DeNardis argues,
facilitating internet openness is not just an engineering function but
also a "constan[t] navigat[ion]" between "diverging social values and
104
interests" that "vary by region."
B. Principleof Internet Security
1. Internet Security Means Both Network and Application Security
Internet security is typically defined as encompassing all
"measures relating to the confidentiality, availability and integrity of
information that is processed, stored and communicated by electronic
or similar means."10 5 Broadly speaking, the implementation of this
principle requires protecting the security of the internet network and
all applications and websites supplied through this network, thereby
preventing "unintended or unauthorized access, change or destruction"
of data transferred through the network. 106 As new threats and
10 7
vulnerabilities emerge every day, no network can be fully secure.
Therefore, ensuring internet security often refers to a higher degree of
security within the network than a completely secure network. In other
words, the implementation of this principle should be aimed at
preserving the fundamental integrity and stability of the network to
the greatest extent possible.10 8 Additionally, the principle of internet
security also refers to security of the applications layer; for example,

103. DANIEL CASTRO & ROBERT ATKINSON, BEYOND INTERNET UNIVERSALISM: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ADDRESSING CROSS-BORDER INTERNET POLIcY 8 (2014),

http://www2.itif.org/2014-crossborder-internet-policy.pdf [https://perma.cc/MLM2JSJR] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
104. DeNardis, supra note 64, at 3.
105.

AusTL. DEP'T OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS & TRADE, AUSTRALIA'S INTERNATIONAL

CYBER ENGAGEMENT STRATEGY 23 (2017) (examining various sources to define
cybersecurity); see also Convention on Cybercrime, pmbl., Nov. 23, 2011, E.T.S. 185
(offering a similar definition based on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of data).
106. Introduction to Cyber Security, UNIV. MD., UNIV. COLLEGE,
https://www.umuc.edu/academic-programs/cyber-security/about.cfm
[https://perma.cc/TFP6-DJ8P] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
107. INTERNET Soc'Y, supra note 63, at 3.
108. Id.
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technical designs of digital services should be secure from foreign
intrusion and/or data theft.1 0 9 Thus, internet security is achieved
through a combination of network and data security, enabling "trust
among networks, between websites and browsers, and in common
technical standards and systems of routing and addressing."' 1 0
Different terms are used to refer to internet security in internet
governance scholarship: cybersecurity,
digital security,
and
111
information security.
2. Increasing Recognition of Internet Security in Various International
Platforms
Several international declarations have emphasised the
importance of internet security. The Tunis Agenda, adopted in phase
two of the World Summit on the Information Society, recognised
internet security as one of the fundamental principles of internet
governance:
[W]e commit ourselves to the stability and security of the [ilnternet as a global
facility and to ensuring the requisite legitimacy of its governance, based on the
full participation of all stakeholders, from both developed and developing
countries, within their respective roles and responsibilities. 1 1 2

Similar declarations, recommendations, and guidelines on internet
security have been issued by regional bodies such as the OECD, 113 the

109. See Martha Finnemore & Duncan B. Hollis, Constructing Norms for Global
Cybersecurity, 110 AM. J. INT'L L. 425, 431 (2016); Duncan B. Hollis, An e-SOS for
Cyberspace, 52 HARV. INT'L L.J. 373, 380 (2011).
110. Laura DeNardis, The Future of Global Cyber Trust: Fragmentation v.
Universality Tradeoffs 3 (Colum. Sch. of Int'l & Pub. Aff., Working Paper, 2017)
[hereinafter DeNardis Future].
111. See, e.g., OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 28; Org. for Econ. Coop.
& Dev. [OECD], DigitalSecurity Risk Management for Economic and Social Prosperity:
OECD Recommendation and Companion Document 19, 20 (Sept. 17, 2015),
https://www.oecd.org/stilieconomy/digital-security-risk-management.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8Q42-KK7T] (archived Feb. 5, 2019) [hereinafter OECD Risk
Management].
112. Tunis Agenda, supra note 83, at ¶31.
113. See OECD Risk Management, supra note 111; Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev.
[OECD], OECD Recommendation of the Council on the Protectionof CriticalInformation
Infrastructures, C(2008)35
(June 2008),
https://www.oecd.org/stil40825404.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GWV2-TBY2] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev.
[OECD], Recommendation of the Council ConcerningGuidelines for Cryptography Policy,
C(97)62/FINAL (Mar. 27, 1997), http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplay
documentpdf/?cote=C(97)62/FINAL&docLanguage=En
[https://perma.cc/SR2Q-8X3P]
(archived Feb. 5, 2019).
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African Union,1 1 4 the G7,11 5 the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
(APEC),11 6 and in the NETMundial Principles.1 17 Many countries are
also working in bilateral arrangements to achieve cooperation on
issues related to internet security.1 18 The IGF has also engaged deeply
with issues of internet security since its inception in 2005.119 The UN
General Assembly adopted several resolutions on promoting global
of critical
issues, protection
on cybersecurity
cooperation
120
the
Further,
crimes.
of
cyber-related
infrastructure, and prevention
in
Developments
on
Experts
Governmental
United Nations Group of
of
Context
in
the
the Field of Information and Telecommunications
was
group,
working
International Security, a UN intergovernmental
actively contributing to the development of international law on global
cybersecurity until its end in 2017.
3. Implementing Principle of Internet Security
Different stakeholders in the internet governance regime are
interested in varied facets of internet security and thus have differing
12
rationales for focusing on internet security. 1 Nonetheless, a
consensus exists among stakeholders that internet security is of

114. African Union Convention on Cyber Security and Personal Data Protection,
art. 8, June 27, 2014, https://au.int/sites/default/files/treaties/29560-treaty-0048african union convention on~cybersecurity-and-personal-data-protection-e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z7NZ-M7C3] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
115. See G7 Declaration on Responsible States Behavior in Cyberspace, Apr. 11,
2017.
116. See, e.g., Asia-Pacific Econ. Cooperation [APEC], APEC Cyber-security
Strategy, Doc. No. telwg26/BFSG/22 (Aug. 2002), http://mddb.apec.org/Documents/2002/
[https://perma.cc/EWB3-YCD2] (Feb.
TEL/TEL26-PLEN/02_tel26_plen-summary.pdf
25, 2019).
117. NETmundial, supra note 89.
118. See, e.g., Franz-Stefan Gady, Japanand the United States to Deepen
Cybersecurity Cooperation, THE DIPLOMAT (June 2, 2015), https://thediplomat.com/
2015/06/japan-and-the-united-states-to-deepen-cybersecurity-cooperation/
[https://perma.cc/ZD7B-M8LZ] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); Scott W. Harold, The U.S.China Cyber Agreement: A Good First Step, THE RAND BLOG (Aug. 1, 2016),
https://www.rand.org/blog/20 16/08/the-us-china-cyber-agreement-a-good-first-step.html
[https://perma.ccIF3FH-F9HH] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); Yuxi Wei, China-Russia
Cybersecurity Cooperation:Working Towards Cyber-Sovereignty, UNIV. WASH. (June 21,
2016), https://jsis.washington.edulnews/china-russia-cybersecurity-cooperationworking-towards-cyber-sovereignty/ [https://perma.cc/4RXA-ZJTZ] (archived Jan. 20,
2019); see also Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 109, at 442.
119. See ALEJANDRO PISANTY, Security, the Key to Trust and Growth of the
Internet, in INTERNET GOVERNANCE: CREATING OPPORTUNITIES FOR ALL 46, 46-54

(2009).
120. G.S. Res. 2010, supra note 7; G.A. Res. 2004, supra note 7; G.A. Res. 2002,
supra note 7; G.A. Res. 2001, supra note 7.
121. Press Release, Internet Soc'y, Internet Society Approach to Cyber Security
https://www.internetsociety.org/news/press2015),
22,
(Jan.
Policy
releases/2015/internet-society-approach-to-cyber-security-policy/
[https://perma.ce/879X-ZBAN] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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implement
largely
Governments
importance.1 22
paramount
cybersecurity laws to address concerns regarding protection of critical
infrastructure from cyberattacks (often conflating national security
and internet security in this process). 123 Further, internet security is
also included in the digital economy strategy of different countries. 124
However, the appetite for risk varies among governments. The Global
Cybersecurity Index, developed by the ITU, illustrates the variation in
the levels of engagement and preparedness of countries on
cybersecurity.1 25 Further, certain countries use cybersecurity or
information security strategies to disguise other political or economic
interests including monitoring information regarding citizens and
protecting local companies. 126 Technology companies are concerned
about internet security to protect their intellectual property as well as
personal data of their customers such as credit card or personal
identification details (including the use of end-to-end encryption). 127
Finally, the internet technical community is also concerned about
incorporating security features in internet protocols. For example, in
1997, the IETF decided that all requests for comment (RFCs)1 28 should
contain a dedicated section on "security considerations of the protocol
or procedures."1 29 But the role of the IETF does not extend to devising

122. JOANNA KULESZA, INTERNATIONAL INTERNET LAW 67 (2012).
123. See BROEDERS, supra note 102, at 13; LAURA DENARDIS ET AL., THE RISING
GEOPOLITICS OF INTERNET GOVERNANCE: CYBER SOVEREIGNTY V. DISTRIBUTED

GOVERNANCE 16-17 (2016).
124. See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], CybersecurityPolicy Making at a
TurningPoint (2012), https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/cybersecurity%20policy%
20making.pdf [https://perma.ce/Q64S-9U52] (archived Feb. 5, 2019); OECD DIGITAL
ECONOMY OUTLOOK 2015, supra note 96, at 30.
125. Global Cybersecurity Index, INT'L TELECOMM. UNION (2017),
https://www.itu.int/dms-pub/itu-d/opb/str/D-STR-GCI.01-2017-R1-PDF-E.pdf
[https://perma.cclLL6N-7333] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
126. Adam Segal, Chinese Cyber Diplomacy in a New Era of Uncertainty 3-5, 16
(Hoover Inst., Aegis Paper Ser. No. 1703), https://www.hoover.org/sites/default/
files/research/docs/segalchinese cyber-diplomacy.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UVA5-PHT2]
(archived Feb. 3, 2019); Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian, The 'ChillingEffect'of China'sNew
Cybersecurity Regime,
FOREIGN
POLICY,
(July
10,
2015,
3:27
PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/07/10/china-new-cybersecurity-law-internet-security/
[https://perma.cc/D3TW-8N3N] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); Janus Kopfstein, Washington's
cybersecurity is about surveillance, not security, AL JAZEERA AM. (Mar. 10, 2015, 2:00
AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2015/3/washingtons-cybersecurity-is-aboutsurveillance-not-security.html [https://perma.cc/47TM-JQLN] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
127. Finnemore & Hollis, supra note 109, at 453; see also Josephine Wolff, What
We Talk About When We Talk About Cybersecurity: Security in Internet Governance
Debates, INTERNET POL'Y REV. 1-4 (Sept. 30, 2016); OECD Risk Management, supra note
111, at 19-20.
128. See Memorandum from S. Hambridge on Netiquette Guidelines, supra note
11.
129. Memorandum from John Postel & J. Reynolds on Instructions to RFC
Authors (Oct. 1997), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2223.pdf [https://perma.cclPSJ5-JWM7]
(archived Feb. 5, 2019); see also Memorandum from E. Rescorla on Guidelines for Writing
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1 30
technical protocols based on domestic laws of individual countries.
The IETF has also designed a new set of technical standards known as
the Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNNSEC), which can
help assess the authenticity of websites (through cryptography), and
prevent malicious attacks.' 3 While some of the above policy objectives
can be achieved harmoniously (e.g., the protection of personal
information also reduces online consumer fraud and surveillance,
network integrity helps prevents coordinated cyberattacks on a
country's critical infrastructure and other digital services), others may
be in conflict (e.g., government measures requiring access to encryption
keys or a source code so as to authenticate its security can compromise
personal data and trade secrets of companies).
The development of protocols or standards on cybersecurity
increasingly requires collaboration between different stakeholders and
a shared understanding regarding their individual roles in the
management of security risks.1 32 The majority of standard-setting on
internet security is not managed by state or intergovernmental bodies,
but rather through informal trust-based relationships among private
bodies such as internet service providers, computer security incident
response teams within companies, domain name registrars, hosting
33
companies, IT departments, and some private security services.1 The
same holds true for management of spain, since most internet service
34
providers rely on spam blocking lists maintained by private entities.1
However, achieving collaboration between various stakeholders on
internet security issues is difficult in practice. For example,
governments often want to exercise control over encryption software
for easier data access while the private sector supports innovation in
internet security standards.

RFC Text on Security Considerations (July 2003), https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc3552.pdf
[https://perma.ccl7N2J-PQZY] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
130. Memorandum from IAB & IESG on IETF Policy on Wiretapping (May 2000),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc2804.pdf [https://perma.cclU5A9-ZH7Q] (archived Feb. 5,
2019).
131. See GCIG ONE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 82.
132. See MILTON L. MUELLER, NETWORKS AND STATES-THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF
INTERNET GOVERNANCE 159-60 (2010); SCOTT J. SHACKELFORD, MANAGING CYBER
ATIACKS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND RELATIONS IN SEARCH OF CYBER PEACE 3-4

(2014).
133. See MUELLER, supra note 132, at 163; Louise Marie Hurel & Louisa Cruz
Lobato, Unpacking Cyber Norms: Private Companies as Norms Entrepreneurs, 3 J.
CYBER POL'Y (2018).

134. For example, Spamhaus, ARM Research Labs,
companies providing DNS blacklists to control spam.
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C. Principleof Internet Privacy
1. Internet Privacy: A User-Centric Approach
Internet privacy refers to protecting the privacy of internet users.
Privacy is closely linked to data protection and often used
35
interchangeably.s
Data protection is an "expression of right to
privacy" and privacy is at "the core of data protection."1 36 Given the
increased use of digital technologies and big data processing (discussed
further below), the principle of internet privacy refers to the protection
of privacy of individual users in the process of managing their personal
data include gathering, storing, using, and transferring such data,' 3 7
as well as protecting it from unwanted surveillance. 3 8 In this Article,
internet privacy excludes data security (i.e., user information is stored
and transferred securely) because it falls within the scope of internet
security, as discussed previously. 39 This distinction is important as
even when data is fully secure from unauthorised access, service
providers can use data in violation of users' privacy-for example,
selling personal data to third-party advertisers without the express
consent of users.1 4 0
The key high-level principles of internet privacy are well
summarised by Lee Bygrave:
Personal data should be collected by fair and lawful means (principle of fair and
lawful processing); the amount of personal data collected should be limited to
what is necessary to achieve the purpose(s) for which the data is gathered and
further processed (principle of minimality); personal data should be collected for
specified, legitimate purposes, and not used in ways that are incompatible with
those purposes (principle of purpose limitation); personal data should be

135. Juliane Kokott & Christoph Sobotta, The Distinction Between Privacy and
DataProtection in the Jurisprudenceof the CJEUandthe ECtHR, 3 INT'L DATA PRIVACY
L. 222, 228 (2013).
136. See id. at 222-23. Some distinguish between the economic rationale behind
privacy (i.e., building consumer trust) from the human rights rationale (i.e., protecting
privacy rights of an individual), and argue that the latter is weaker than the former. See,
e.g., Yakovleva, supra note 37, at 478.
137. See LEE A. BYGRAVE, DATA PRIVACY LAW 1 (2014).
138. See Steve Henn, If There's Privacy in the DigitalAge, It Has a New
Definition, NPR (Mar. 3, 2014, 4:00 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/
alltechconsidered/2014/03/03/285334820/if-theres-privacy-in-the-digital-age-it-has-anew-definition [https://perma.cc/A7M4-QZPZ] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
139. See BYGRAVE, supra note 137, at 2.
140. See Alex Hern, Social networks may have to reveal how they target users
with ads, THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 6, 2018, 1:16 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/20 18/mar/06/social-networks-reveal-how-they-target-users-with-politicalads [https://perma.cc/6Y5A-NN5X] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); Kurt Wagner, This is how
Facebook uses your data for ad targeting, RECODE (Apr. 11, 2018, 6:00 AM),
https://www.recode.net/2018/4/11/17177842/facebook-advertising-ads-explained-markzuckerberg [https://perma.cc/G3KG-RH29] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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relevant, accurate, and complete in relation to the purposes for which it is
processed (principle of data quality); personal data should be protected against
unauthorized attempts to disclose, delete, change, or exploit it (principle of data
security); and processing of personal data should be transparent to, and capable
14 1
of being influenced by, the data subject (principle of data subject influence).

The above principles are well recognised in existing data protection
laws; 14 2 however, the norm of privacy is culture specific and can vary
across countries. For example, in certain countries, an individual's
privacy is considered secondary to other interests such as national
security or maintenance of public order or even commercial
interests. 143 Even in countries with developed privacy regimes, a
conflict could exist regarding the proper approach for achieving
internet privacy. In particular, scholars have discussed the clash
between the European Union (EU)-type model and the US-type model
of privacy and data protection in great detail.1 44 While the EU-type
model is prescriptive and adopts a comprehensive framework on
privacy and data protection, the United States adopts a more marketoriented approach, largely depending on self-regulation on privacy
issues, barring a few sensitive issues.1 45 Further, certain scholars
argue that a US-type approach aimed at ensuring privacy to facilitate
consumer trust is weaker than an EU-type approach premised on
protecting a fundamental right.1 46 In practice, however, this argument
is inconclusive as the means or tools used to enforce privacy ultimately
determine their effectiveness. For example, a certain country can
severely restrict cross-border data flows out of its borders through
prescriptive data transfer requirements without achieving significant
increase in privacy protection. Conversely, a country may allow crossborder data flows but impose strict requirements on all service
suppliers to comply with its privacy laws.
The development of big data analytics has triggered significant
concerns regarding protection of privacy of internet users. 1 47 In recent

141. BYGRAVE, supra note 137, at 1-2. As discussed earlier, I cover data security
under internet security rather than internet privacy.
142. About 57 percent of countries worldwide have a data protection law. See
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development, Data Protectionand Privacy Legislation
Worldwide, https://unctad.org/en/Pages/DTL/STI-andICTs/ICT4D-LegislationleComData-Protection-Laws.aspx [https://perma.cc/3PMS-SG7A (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
143. The concept of information security embedded in its domestic cybersecurity
laws refers to national or public security rather than individual's right to privacy. See
Jyh-An Lee, Hacking Into China's Cybersecurity Law, 53 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 57, 8994 (2018).
144. See Catherine L. Mann, International Internet Governance-Oh What a
Tangled Web We Could Have, 2 GEO. J. INT'L AFF. 79, 81 (2001).
145. See id.
146. See Yakovleva, supra note 37, at 7-8.
147. See, e.g., Press Release, Internet Soc'y, Majority (52%) Says They're More
Concerned About Online Privacy Than They Were a Year Ago (May 17, 2018),
https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/files/documents/CIGI-2018-Factum.pdf
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years, concerned users have brought actions against technology
companies for invading their privacy-for instance, the legal challenge
against Facebook by an Austrian activist, Maximillian Schrems, in
2013.148 Commercial surveillance is common in many free services
such as email, social networking sites, and messenger applications. For
example, the providers of these services collect enormous amounts of
customer data, which is used for targeted advertising or sold to third
parties, often without informed user consent. 149 Even in paid services
such as cloud computing, significant uncertainty exists for users
regarding where their data is stored, how it can be used or transferred,
and the extent to which company officials or third parties have access
to it.' 50 Similarly, internet privacy is eroded by online surveillance
programs carried out by government intelligence agencies.1 5 Several
governments demand that digital service providers provide
information such as their source code and encryption keys in order to
offer services in that country, potentially endangering user privacy.1 52
Thus, internet privacy is a central concern in internet governance, and
is a key requirement for ensuring secure and free data flows.
2. Growing Recognition of Internet Privacy
Within the internet governance regime, privacy and data
protection are unanimously recognised as fundamental issues. The UN
General Assembly has noted that the increasing "capacity of
governments, companies and individuals to undertake surveillance,
interception and data collection" can threaten the privacy of
individuals, and that states need to take necessary action in this
regard.' 5 3 Several international human rights treaties also recognise

[https://perma.cc/K7GM-YUBV] (archived Jan. 20, 2019) [hereinafter Internet Soc'y
Press Release].
148. Schrems v. Data Prot. Comm'r, Case C-363/14, E.C.L.I:C:2015:650 (2015);
see also Derek Scally, Max Schrems files first cases under GDPR against Facebook and
Google, THE IRISH TIMES (May 25, 2018, 6:15 PM), https://www.irishtimes.com/
business/technology/max-schrems-files-first-cases-under-gdpr-against-facebook-andgoogle-1.3508177 [https://perma.cc/Z3LV-8VDL] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. Certain civil society groups are attempting to build consensus around
principles that should apply to governments engaging in surveillance. See, e.g.,
International Principles on the Application of Human Rights to Communications
Surveillance,

NECESSARY

&

PROPORTIONATE

(2014),

https://necessaryandproportionate.org/files/2016/03/04/en-principles_2014.pdf
[https://perma.cc/F48Z-STK5] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
152.

See MARTINA F. FERRACANE ET AL., DIGITAL TRADE RESTRICTIVENESS INDEX

33-35 (2018), http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eulwp-content/uploads/2018/
09/DTRI-final.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HGD-Z7GF] (archived Feb. 5, 2019).
153. G.A. Res. 71/199 (Dec. 19, 2016); see also G.A. Res. 45/95, (Dec. 14, 1990).
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the right to privacy of individuals, 154 although these treaties only refer
to domestic violations of privacy rights, not cross-territorial conduct
15 5
Several
such as online commercial and governmental surveillance.
15 6
privacy.
of
importance
the
recognise
also
international declarations
In the Tunis Agenda, the multistakeholder community expressed its
commitment to "strengthe[n] the trust framework," including
enhancing international cooperation on data protection and privacy
issues.1 5 7 However, to date, no international consensus exists
regarding regulation of both commercial and governmental
surveillance, or definitions of privacy or data protection.
Among regional organisations, the OECD recognises the
importance of "consistency and effectiveness in privacy protection at a
15 8
The OECD
global level" as "good practice" in internet governance.
contains
which
Framework,
Privacy
has adopted the OECD
including
countries
member
for
guidelines
implementation
development of a national privacy strategy alongside adoption of
59
privacy laws and enforcement mechanisms.1 One of the key concerns
in the OECD framework was to ensure that privacy laws did not
16 0
Closely related to the
become a tool for disguised protectionism.
OECD framework, APEC countries have adopted a voluntary privacy
framework which "recogniz[es] the importance of the development of
effective privacy protections that avoid barriers to information flows,
61
ensure continued trade, and economic growth in the APEC region."1
Amongst domestic regulations, the GDPR of the EU is the most
comprehensive and detailed framework on data protection.
3. Implementing Principle of Internet Privacy
Although certain values related to internet privacy are recognised
globally, governments enforce privacy and data protection laws in

154. G.A. Res. 217, art. 12, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948);
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), art. 17, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
(Mar. 23, 1976); European Convention on Human Rights, art. 8 (Nov. 4, 1950).
155. See Frederic Gilles Sourgens, The Privacy Principle, 42 YALE J. INT'L L. 345,
355-57 (2017) (noting that "global or extraterritorial conduct is not within the scope of
the ICCPR").
156. See Paul De Hert & Valeis Papakonstantinou, Three Scenarios for
International Governance of Data Privacy: Towards an International Data Privacy
Organization,Preferablya UN Agency?, 9 I/S: A J.L. & POL'Y INFO. SOc'Y 271, 293-300
(2013).
157. See Tunis Agenda, supra note 83, at 1 39.
158. See Org. for Econ. Coop. & Dev. [OECD], The OECD Privacy Framework
(2013), http://www.oecd.org/stiieconomy/oecd-privacy-framework.pdf [https://perma.cc/
J7MD-7CVH] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
159. See id. at 19.
160.

BYGRAVE, supra note 137, at 44.

161.

See APEC, supranote 8, at foreword; see also BYGRAVE, supra note 137, at 77.
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different ways, based on their political and cultural perspectives. 162
Governments impose various checks on data collectors and processors
in their domestic laws so as to ensure more transparency in the process
of data collection, such as imposing consumer consent requirements for
collecting, transferring, or using personal data. 16 3 Since these
regulatory practices and laws are not always uniform across countries,
they create legal uncertainty for digital service providers operating on
a cross-border basis, including significant increases in compliance
costs.
In order to implement internet privacy, companies managing
internet infrastructure (such as internet intermediaries and network
operators) and those offering digital services incorporate necessary
privacy features in their services, for example, through end-to-end
encryption and transparent practices in data processing.1 64 Further, in
order to address the "trust gap" of internet users in countries with
extensive mass surveillance programmes, leading technology
companies are now providing annual transparency reports including
government requests for user data.1 6 5
The internet technical community also recognises internet privacy
as one of the fundamental considerations in devising protocols and
architectural designs.' 6 6 However, organisations such as the IETF also
acknowledge that the legal and political aspects of surveillance or

162. See Joanna Kulesza, International Law Challenges to Location Privacy
Protection, 3 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 158, 161 (2013).
163. See, e.g., EU Data Protection Regulation, supra note 59, arts. 4, 6, 7, 49.
164. Amnesty International, How Private Are Your FavouriteMessagingApps?,
AMNESTY INT'L (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/campaigns/

2016/10/which-messaging-apps-best-protect-your-privacy/?date=2016-1224&imagelndex=12&matchday=2&id=20518228265&view=zertifikate&i=6&facelift=tr
ue&addUrlParams--true [https://perma.cc/8VM9-Q642] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
165. See, e.g., Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE,
https://transparencyreport.google.com/?hl=en (last visited Mar. 13, 2019)
[https://perma.cc/3BDD-UNNH] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
166. See Memorandum from A. Cooper et al. on Privacy Considerations for
Internet
Protocols
(July
2013),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc6973.pdf
[https://perma.cclDJ3R-RV9N] (archived Feb. 6, 2019) (providing a catalogue for
assessment of the privacy level of technical protocols); Memorandum from IAB & IESG,
LAB and IESG Statement on Cryptographic Technology and the Internet (Aug. 1996),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfcl984.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF58-K9K3] (archived Feb. 5,
2019) (one of the earliest RFCs to recognise "the need for increased protection of
international commercial transactions on the Internet, and by the need to offer all
Internet users an adequate degree of privacy," particularly focusing on the importance
of public key cryptography to ensure internet trust and security); Memorandum from
Stephen
Farrell,
Pervasive
Monitoring
is
an
Attack
(May
2014),
https://tools.ietf.org/pdf/rfc7258.pdf [https://perma.cc/VXF4-GG2E] (archived Feb. 6,
2019) (outlining the various considerations in preventing surveillance); N. ten Oever,
Guidelines for Human Rights Protocol Considerations (Mar. 20, 2018) (draft) (expired on
Sept.
21,
2018),
https://tools.ietf.org/id/draft-irtf-hrpc-guidelines-O0.html
[https://perma.cc/CG4Z-5528] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
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1 67
In
pervasive monitoring are outside the scope of their competence.
the
of
days
early
the
since
noted
were
fact, privacy-related concerns
IETF.1 68 Engineers in organisations such as the IETF and the World
Wide Web Consortium (W3C) as well as within private companies
develop protocols and architectural designs that enforce internet
69
privacy in the underlying logical layer and the applications layer.'
They also consider prevailing privacy risks and existing privacy models
170
in making several technical recommendations.
Given the complexities associated with implementing internet
privacy, experts have advocated the need for greater collaboration
between governments, the private sector, and the internet technical
community.1 7 1 Insufficient coordination between various stakeholders
on internet privacy often results in highly restrictive measures such as
data localisation that are harmful for both commercial and technical
reasons. However, internet privacy is as such not a barrier to digital
flows; in fact, implementing internet privacy enables users to trust the
network and digital services, thus facilitating its use for commercial
2
and other purposes.' 7 In order to enable higher levels of internet
privacy, certain governments have entered into arrangements to
enable data transfers without compromising on privacy; for example,
the EU and the United States have entered into the Privacy Shield,
and the APEC countries have a voluntary certification system to
3
facilitate data flows.17 Certain governments adopt deeper provisions
that not only impose principles for data protection, but also require
service suppliers to hardwire privacy in their technical designs. For
example, the EU sets a requirement in the GDPR for data protection
74
by design and default.1

167. See, e.g., Adamantia Rachovitsa, Engineering and Lawyering Privacy by
Design: UnderstandingOnline PrivacyBoth as a Technical and an InternationalHuman
Rights Issue, 24 INT'L J.L. & INFO. TECH. 374, 376 (2016); Memorandum from A. Cooper,
supra note 166; Memorandum from Stephen Farrell, supra note 166; Memorandum from

J. Kempf, supranote 69.
168. Lee A. Bygrave, HardwiringPrivacy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LAW,
REGULATION AND TECHNOLOGY 755, 766 (Roger Brownsword et al. eds., 2017).

169. See IETF RFCs, supra note 11; see also W3C Mission, W3C (2017),
https://www.w3.org/Consortium/mission[https://perma.cc/R4MU-KPFS] (archived Jan.
20, 2019).
170. See Memorandum from Stephen Farrell, supra note 166, at 3-4.
171.

See ORG. FOR ECON. Coop. & DEv. [OECD], THIRTY YEARS AFTER: THE OECD

(2011), http://www.oecd.org/stilieconomy/49710223.pdf
13
GUIDELINES
PRIvAcY
[https://perma.cclB9AJ-U2HE] (archived Feb. 6, 2019) (acknowledging "encouraging
signs of a broad multi-stakeholder commitment on the part of privacy advocates, the
technical community, businesses and governments to protecting privacy"); DeNardis
Future, supra note 110.

172.

DeNardis Future, supra note 110.

173.

About

CBPRS,

CROSS

BORDER

PRIVACY

RULES

SYSTEM,

http://cbprs.org/about-cbprs/ (last visited Feb. 6, 2019) [https://perma.cclG7FB-5WSG]
(archived Jan. 19, 2019).
174. EU Data Protection Regulation, supra note 59, art. 25.
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D. Complementarity of Internet Openness, Security, and Privacy
At first sight, internet openness appears to be an isolated
principle, and arguably in conflict with the principles of internet
security and privacy, as security and privacy measures can directly or
indirectly interfere with the unrestricted flow of data through the
internet. In practice, however, openness in data flows is realistically
only possible in a network in which privacy and security features are
embedded into the network.17 5 Questions related to internet openness
"cross-cu[t] specific issues such as . .. accessibility, security, and
privacy."1 7 6 Simply put, the more efficiently and safely data can be
transferred across borders, the easier it is for digital service providers
to sell across the world. This subpart demonstrates how these three
principles are mutually supportive and complementary and should be
applied collectively in regulating data flows.
Internet security and internet openness are often seen as being
opposing principles, as internet openness can facilitate cybercrime
such as cyberespionage, theft of personal information, and attacks on
critical infrastructure of a country.' 7 7 The typical argument is that
internet openness opens the door to various kinds of malicious and
criminal activities; thus, to improve the security of the network, certain
checks are necessary to minimise these threats. 7 8 Governments and
other stakeholders can justifiably impose restrictions on internet
openness in order to safeguard security of the network and user
data.' 7 9 As the internet transformed from a research-based network to
a commercial platform, certain levels of restrictions on the openness of
the network have arguably become necessary to ensure greater
80
security.o
Nonetheless, internet security needs to be balanced with
other objectives such as the free flow of information, as is also
recognised in the Convention on Cybercrime.181
Further, the openness of the internet itself is not the cause of
malicious or illegal activity, provided that security and privacy
features are incorporated into available digital services and devices.1 82

175.

INTERNET SOC'Y, supra note 63, at 3; OECD DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note

96, at 19; Jeremy West, A Frameworkfor UnderstandingInternet Openness, in GLOBAL
COMMssIoN ON INTERNET GOVERNANCE 2016 at 5 (Ctr. for Int'l Governance Innovation

& Chatham House, Paper Ser. No. 35, 2016), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/
files/gcig-no.35_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/2Z9L-MEEW] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
176. GCIG ONE INTERNET, supra note 1, at 2.
177. OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 10.
178. Id. at 6.
179. Hill, supra note 62, at 53-54.
180. Jonathan L. Zittrain, The GenerativeInternet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 197778 (2006).
181. Convention on Cybercrime, supra note 105.
182. INTERNET SOC'Y, supra note 63, at 3; OECD DIGITAL ECONOMY, supra note
96, at 19; West, supra note 175, at 5.
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In fact, internet openness is enhanced when adequate and necessary
standards of internet security and privacy are incorporated in both the
logical and transport layers of the network and the applications that
run on the network. In other words, these tools facilitate the flow of
information.18 3 Similarly, internet users are likely to place greater
trust in open networks, rather than closed networks (often run by
specific companies or mandated by certain governments), because
surveillance can be easily conducted in closed networks, resulting in
breach of user privacy. 184 Internet openness also stimulates more
innovation in ensuring higher standards of security and privacy as it
185
becomes necessary for increasing economic activity.
Conversely, lack of internet privacy or security can reduce
internet openness, as many users either stop using certain services or
186
Further, blocking data flows
"tur[n] to closed, proprietary solutions."
does not counter all security risks, because intelligent users,
particularly cybercriminals, can often work around firewalls or other
filtering tools.1 8 7 Even data restrictive measures arguably designed to

ensure internet security and privacy can backfire because the
concentration of data in specific local servers makes it more vulnerable
to cyberattacks and external surveillance, particularly in jurisdictions
with poor cybersecurity laws.18 8 Thus, rather than being contradictory,
internet openness is enhanced by internet security, and vice versa.
Finally, open technical standards and protocols are more secure than
closed and proprietary standards, as the security and privacy features
89
of the latter remain unknown to users.1 Therefore, interfering with
the openness of the internet not only disturbs flows of data, but also
1 90
affects the "security, flexibility, and stability" of the network.
Internet privacy and internet security are also interrelated
principles. As Christopher Kuner argues:
Privacy depends absolutely on security. No obligation to provide privacy,
whether entered into voluntarily or compelled by law, will be meaningful if the
data to be protected are accessed or stolen by unauthorized third parties. As a
result, all modern data protection principles include an obligation to protect
security as well. Data privacy and cybersecurity are often advanced by common
tools, such as encryption, data minimization, and limits on collecting, retaining,

183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

West, supra note 175, at 7; see also DeNardis Future, supra note 110.
Internet Soc'y Press Release, supra note 147.
SINGH, supra note 14, at 2.
GCIG ONE INTERNET, supra note 1, at vii.
See infra Section O.A3.
Anupam Chander & Uyen P. Le, Breaking the Web: Data Localization vs. the

Global Internet, in U.C. DAvIS LEGAL STUDIES RESEARCH PAPER SERIES 30 (U.C. Davis,

Research Paper No. 378, 2014).
189. DeNardis Destabilizing, supra note 97, at 130.
190. OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 8.
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and transferring personal data. In short, what is good for privacy is often good
19 1
for security as well.

However, implementing internet security can sometimes be
detrimental to personal privacy, for example, "by requiring identity
verification, reducing online anonymity, and sharing potentially
personal information about cyberattacks."1 9 2
The interplay between the principles of internet openness,
security, and privacy provides a useful guide in achieving balance and
coherence in the regulation of data flows. 19 3 In fact, this
complementarity is the foundation of an open and trusted internet. 194
Measures related to internet security and privacy act as building
blocks, rather than impediments to data flows. Thus, these three
principles are neither contrary to each other, nor do they operate in
isolation of each other-rather, they are complementary.
A clash between internet openness and security or privacy laws or
standards is a clash between multistakeholder norms and choices
relevant to sovereignty, such as protecting social, political, or economic
goals.19 5 In practice, many of these conflicts can be minimised if these
principles are understood from a transnational point of view and in a
collective manner. However, certain challenges remain, particularly
due to lack of global standards on internet privacy and security. For
example, diverging privacy laws or conflicting security standards in
different countries make it difficult for service providers to transfer
data freely across countries via the internet, hampering internet
openness in the process. One such challenge addressed in the next Part
discusses both the relevance
and challenges involved in
operationalising these three principles in the context of application,
interpretation, and, potentially, the reform of international trade law.

191. Christopher Kuner et al., The Rise of Cybersecurity and its Impact on Data
Protection, 7 INT'L DATA PRIVACY L. 73, 73-74 (2017); see also Rachovitsa, supra note
167, at 386.
192. Kuner, supra note 191, at 74.
193. In the words of Kleinwachter, "everything is connected to everything." See
Wolfgang Kleinwitchter, Internet Governance Outlook 2017: NationalisticHierarchiesvs.
Multistakeholder
Networks?,
CIRCLEID
(Jan.
6,
2017,
9:50
AM),
http://www.circleid.com/posts/20160106_internet-outlook2017 nationalistic hierarchi
es-multistakeholder/ [https://perma.cc/38CL-8S25] (archived Jan. 19, 2019).
194. INTERNET SocY, A POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR AN OPEN AND TRUSTED INTERNET
3
(2017),
https://www.internetsociety.org/wp-content/uploads/201 7/08/bp-Trust20170314 -en.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z22K-LU56] (archived Jan. 19, 2019); see also
INTERNET
Soc'Y,
GLOBAL
INTERNET
REPORT
2016
at
22
(2016),
https://www.internetsociety.org/globalinternetreport/2016/wp-content/uploads/2016/1 1/
ISOCGIR 2016-vl.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH2F-PF4D] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); Carl
Bildt & Gordon Smith, The One and Future Internet, 1 J. CYBER POL'Y, 142, 145 (2016).
195. DeNardis, supra note 64, at 3.
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IV. OPERATIONALISING INTERNET OPENNESS, SECURITY, AND PRIVACY
IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW

The principles of internet openness, security, and privacy are not
binding in international law, but rather originate from soft law
instruments such as international declarations as well as several
extralegal instruments such as RFCs, industry best practices, and
other technical documents. 19 6 In practice, both domestic laws and
regulations usually do not reflect an optimum balance of internet
openness, security, and privacy that is necessary to ensure the security
and integrity of data flows. For example, as discussed earlier, certain
governments privilege internet security or privacy over internet
openness, while others do not pay adequate attention to the role of
19 7
internet security and privacy in facilitating internet openness.
This Part argues that despite the nonbinding nature of the
principles of internet openness, security, and privacy, they can be
relevant in applying, interpreting, and/or reforming international
trade law. At the outset, it argues that these three principles can
potentially contribute to achieving different objectives of the GATS and
WTO Agreement. Further, these three principles help facilitate a
sound framework for digital trade. Finally, this Part argues that these
principles can be helpful in (i) interpreting existing trade rules in
disputes such as providing evidence on the technical aspects of certain
data restrictive measures and (ii) understanding the gaps and
formulating new rules on cross-border data flows in international trade
law. Although this Part largely refers to provisions in WTO
agreements, its arguments would also be relevant for PTAs aimed at
promoting greater liberalisation in the services sector.
A. The Principlesof Internet Openness, Security, and Privacy and
Objectives of GATS and WTO Agreement Are Mutually Compatible
The principles of internet openness, security, and privacy are
compatible with the underlying economic welfare objective of WTO
law. The economic welfare objective is embodied in the preamble of the
98
WTO Agreement:
Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective
demand, and expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while
allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources

196.

See supra Part 0. For a discussion on soft law, see Diane Shelton, Soft Law,

in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 68, 70 (David Armstrong ed., 2012).

197.
198.

See infra Part IV.B.3 and IV.C.3.
Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 22, at pmbl.
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Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure
that developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure
a share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of
199
their economic development.

To achieve the above objectives, the WTO members agree to
engage in trade liberalisation by "entering into reciprocal and mutually
advantageous arrangements" for reducing tariffs and non-tariff
barriers to trade as well as "eliminating discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations. "200
Similarly, the GATS Preamble also recognises the importance of
trade liberalisation and balancing the interests of developing and
developed countries: 201
Wishing to establish a multilateral framework of principles and rules for trade
in services with a view to the expansion of such trade under conditions of
transparency and progressive liberalization and as a means of promoting the
economic growth of all trading partners and the development of developing
countries;
Desiring the early achievement of progressively higher levels of liberalization
of trade in services through successive rounds of multilateral negotiations aimed
at promoting the interests of all participants on a mutually advantageous basis
and at securing an overall balance of rights and obligations, while giving due
respect to national policy objectives ...
Desiring to facilitate the increasing participation of developing countries in
trade in services and the expansion of their service exports including, inter alia,
through the strengthening of their domestic services capacity and its efficiency
and competitiveness. 2 0 2

The principles of internet openness, security, and privacy enable
a globally interconnected network, allowing for more digital innovation
and new businesses, and thereby, help achieve greater economic
welfare through trade liberalisation. The digital services market is the
fastest growing sector in the world today and is a key driver of the
global economy. 20 3 The entry barriers in the industry are low, and
consumers have access to a range of competitive and high-quality
services from across the world.20 4 Further, digital platforms have also

199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. Annex 1B, preamble.
202. Id.
203. See Manyika, supra note 13.
204. See Micro-Multinationals, Global Consumers and the WTO, EBAY,
https://www.ebaymainstreet.com/sites/default/files/Micro-MultinationalsGlobalConsumersWTOReport 1.pdf (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) [https://perma.cc/LA2QG4E7] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); ORG. FOR EcON. COOP. & DEV. [OECD], SMALL AND
MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES: LOcAL STRENGTH, GLOBAL REACH (June 2000),
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increased access of small and medium enterprises to consumers
2 05
Experts have argued that
outside their local or domestic markets.
in developing
entrepreneurs
digital services will be critical in enabling
a
wider global
reach
to
countries and least developed countries
audience in a cost-effective manner, and help reduce income gaps
20 6
These businesses also
between developing and developed countries.
207
generate revenues and increase employment for the local people.
Thus, the increased use of the internet as a platform for trade directly
helps achieve the fundamental objectives set out in the WTO
Agreement and GATS.
Further, implementing the principles of internet openness,
and
transparent
more
requires
privacy
and
security,
For
flows.
data
nondiscriminatory measures in relation to cross-border
or
the
security
example, governments would need to clearly establish
these
devising
privacy rationales behind data restrictive measures. In
measures, governments could collaborate with relevant stakeholders
in the industry and civil society to find the right balance between
internet openness, security, and privacy. As a result, governmental
practices that diminish accessibility and trust of digital services to
favour domestic companies or enable secret access to data will be
minimised. Therefore, in implementing these three principles,
governments can also achieve core objectives in WATO law of
20 8
transparency and nondiscrimination.
Finally, although the GATS was not devised to promote digital
trade, the balancing of internet openness, security, and privacy can
contribute to finding the desired balance between liberalising digital
trade and safeguarding domestic policy objectives (relevant to the
internet and cyberspace) as enshrined under GATS (particularly
Article X). 2 09 The principles of internet privacy and security
explicitly recognise the need for regulatory frameworks where data and
network integrity and security as well as privacy of individuals are
protected. However, as discussed earlier in Part III.D, when
implemented in a reasoned and objective manner, these principles

(archived
[https://perma.cclUM4W-VWTR]
http://www.oecd.org/cfe/1eed/1918307.pdf
Feb. 6, 2019).
205. See, e.g., Huijun Jin & Fiona Hurd, Exploring the Impact of DigitalPlatforms
on SME Internationalization:New Zealand SMEs Use of the Alibaba Platform for
Chinese Market Entry, 19 J. ASIA-PAC. Bus. 72, 91-92 (2018).
206. See, e.g., Laura Tyson & Susan Lund, Digital Globalization and the
Developing World, PROJECT SYNDICATE (Mar. 25, 2016), https://www.projectsyndicate.org/commentary/digital-globalization-opportunities-developing-countries-bylaura-tyson-and-susan-lund-2016-03 [https://perma.cc/Z2HT-A6XG] (archived Jan. 20,
2019).
207. See Micro-Multinationals,Global Consumers and the WTO, supra note 204.
208. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 22, Annex 1B, arts. III, II, VI, XVI,
XVII.
209. See id. Annex 1B, art. XIV.
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enable a free and open internet rather than constraining data flows. 210
By following these principles in regulating cross-border data flows,
governments can achieve the necessary balance required to protect
domestic policy goals without unduly interfering with internet
openness (thereby, also enabling more digital trade). 2 11
B. Internet Openness, Security, and PrivacyAre Beneficial for Digital
Trade
The complementarity of internet openness, security, and privacy
brings a new perspective in international trade law: contrary to
popular perception, internet security and privacy can promote free flow
of data and trade in digital services, provided they are consistent and
reasonable and promote global, interoperable standards. Thus, not just
internet openness, but also internet security and privacy, are highly
beneficial for digital trade. This subpart explains further how internet
openness, security, and privacy, when achieved in a balanced manner,
benefit the growth of digital trade.
1. Internet Openness and Digital Trade Liberalisation Go Together
Internet openness benefits digital trade for several reasons. As
explained earlier, internet openness is not only about technical
openness, but also has significant social and economic aspects. For
instance, internet openness enhances opportunities for service
providers to innovate anywhere and thereby helps them sell their
products globally rather than in regional or domestic markets; internet
openness also provides greater choice to consumers, in terms of both
price and quality. 2 12 Further, the use of open and global standards and
protocols enhances consumer confidence by increasing consumer choice
and enhancing security of digital services.2 1 3 Generally speaking,
barriers to internet openness also constitute barriers to trade in digital
services. However, certain forms of restrictions may be justified to
protect the security or stability of the internet, or enhance consumer
confidence. In such cases, a more reasoned approach is necessary to
distinguish illegal protectionist barriers from legitimate measures
allowable under the different exceptions in international trade
agreements.

210. See supra Part 1II.D.
211. See infra Part IV.B.1.
212. See Box, supra note 67; DRAKE, supra note 28, at 36; OECD Internet Openness,
supra note 63, at 9.
213. OECD Internet Openness, supra note 63, at 8; West, supra note 175, at 3.
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2. Internet Security Supports Digital Trade
Internet users are increasingly anxious about using digital
services that they deem to be less secure-for instance, those services
whose databases have been hacked by criminals or foreign
governments previously. 214 Consequently, internet users may also
avoid using certain digital services that do not use recognised
electronic payment services or are offered from countries with poor
cybersecurity standards. 215 Therefore, to gain consumer trust and
make competitive products for a global market, digital service
providers should be able to adopt higher levels of innovation in security
of their services. 2 16 Thus, internet security plays a critical role in
supporting digital trade.
In certain cases, cybersecurity standards can also become an
impediment to free digital trade. For example, China mandates the
adoption of indigenous standards that are believed to be less secure
and transparent than open standards. 217 Further, the Chinese
government demands access to encryption keys as well as source code
used in digital services, 218 thereby also increasing the risk of
surveillance and trade secret theft from foreign companies. Such
measures not only deter foreign service providers from entering the
domestic market but also adversely affect consumers of digital services.
In a similar vein, some countries block certain foreign websites or
services as they do not consider their underlying technology to be
secure enough. 219 This blockage may result in depriving consumers of

214. See, e.g., Nicolas Rivero, The Biggest Data Breaches of All Time, Ranked,
QUARTZ (Nov. 30, 2018), https://qz.com/1480809/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-all-timeranked/ [https://perma.cc/9L6V-SKE9] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
215. Internet Soc'y Press Release, supra note 147.
216.

DANIEL CASTRO & ALAN MCQUINN,

INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND.,

UNLOCKING ENCRYPTION: INFORMATION SECURITY AND THE RULE OF LAW 9, 35 (2016),
http://www2.itif.org/2016-unlocking-encryption.pdf'?ga=2.32927998.1310045406.15473
16400-115360438.1547316400 [https://perma.cc/HC2G-67NW] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
217.

See NATHANIEL AHRENS, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC & INT'L STUDIES, NATIONAL

SECURITY AND CHINA'S INFORMATION SECURITY STANDARDS (2012), https://csisprod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy-files/files/publication/121108_Ahrens
(archived Jan. 20,
NationalSecurityChina-web.pdf [https://perma.cclW2EL-EFUJ]
2019); see also Hill, supra note 62, at 54.
218. Microsoft and International Business Machines Inc. have provided their
source code to the Chinese government, in order to sell their digital products in the
domestic market. See Theodore H. Moran, Should US Tech Companies Share Their
"Source Code" with China?, PETERSON INST. FOR INT'L ECON.: REAL TIME ECON. ISSUES
WATCH (Oct. 27, 2015, 10:45 AM), https://piie.com/blogs/realtime-economic-issueswatch/should-us-tech-companies-share-their-source-code-china [https://perma.cc/8EPE7X3S] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
219. See, e.g., U.K Cybersecurity Chief Wants National Filter to Block "Bad
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/u-k14, 2016),
Addresses", CBS NEWS (Sept.
[https://perma.cc/9EQV-9QSV]
cybersecurity-chief-wants-filter-to-block-bad-addresses/
(archived Jan. 20, 2019); Leonhard Weese, What Does China's VPNBan Really Mean?,
FORBES (Jan. 25, 2017), http://www.forbes.com/sites/leonhardweese/2017/01/25/what-
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high-quality and competitively-priced digital services even when there
are no security concerns. 220 However, achieving a high level of internet
security implies adoption of reasonable standards that enable data
flows; thus, if this principle is implemented in its spirit, such
restrictive standards can be eliminated, giving way to more global and
innovative cybersecurity standards.
3. Internet Privacy Is a Precondition for Digital Trade
Implementing internet privacy is increasingly recognised as one
of the fundamental requirements for digital trade. Recent PTAs
recognise the importance of ensuring the trust and confidence of users
of electronic commerce, including a sound framework for protecting
personal data. 22 1 Particularly after certain recent exposures involving
massive privacy breaches by digital giants such as Facebook, users are
more aware of privacy policies of companies and are likely to prefer
those which ensure more privacy for their users. 22 2 Moreover, crossborder trade in digital services will only grow in an environment where
individual users do not feel threatened by service providers;
particularly by how they control/use their data. In that context, the EU
has argued consistently that trade and data protection should go
together. 223

does-chinas-vpn-ban-really-mean/#6e6963c2efdc
[https://perma.cclZQ7J-ADP7]
(archived Jan. 20, 2019).
220. See, e.g., Andrew Roth, Russia blocks millions of IP addresses in battle against
Telegram app, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/
world/2018/apr/17/russia-blocks-millions-of-ip-addresses-in-battle-against-telegramapp [https://perma.cclZMG8-QBZN] (archived Jan, 20, 2019).
221. See, e.g., CPTPP, supra note 16, art. 14.8; Comprehensive Economic and
Trade Agreement, Can.-E.U., art. 16.4, Oct. 30, 2016, O.J. (L 11) 23; Free Trade
Agreement, China-S. Kor., art. 13.5, June 1, 2015, http://fta.mofcom.gov.cn/koreal
annex/xdzw en.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QEG-QD32] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); Agreement
Establishing the ASEAN-Australia, New Zealand Free Trade Area (AANZFTA) art. 7,
Feb. 27, 2009, https://dfat.gov.aultrade/agreements/in-force/aanzftalofficial-documents
/Pages/agreement-establishing-the-asean-australia-new-zealand-free-trade-areaaanzfta.aspx [https://perma.cc/HJK3-T2JV] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); Council Decision
2011/265, art. 7.48.2, Dec. 13, 2015, 2011 O.J. (L 127) (EU).
222. For a succinct summary of the Cambridge Analytica scandal concerning
Facebook, see Michael Riley et al., How the Facebook Cambridge Analytica Scandal
Unfolded, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 21, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201803-21/understanding-the-facebook-cambridge-analytica-story-quicktake
[https://perma.cclM2MP-VNWZ] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
223.

Communication from the Commission to the European Parliamentand the

Council, Exchangingand ProtectingPersonalData in a Globalised World, sec. I.3 COM
(2017) 7 final (Jan. 10, 2017).
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C. Applying and InterpretingPrinciplesof InternationalTrade Law
Principles of internet governance are not binding in international
law. Wolfgang Kleinwachter argues that the adoption of resolutions
and recommendations by intergovernmental organisations, such as the
G8 and the OECD, and individual countries, such as the EU and the
United States, on issues related to internet governance such as free
flow of information, privacy, and cybersecurity, marks a "policy shift"
towards a soft law approach that is addressed to the internet
multistakeholder community. 22 4 Joanna Kulesza argues that
principles of internet governance found in multistakeholder
22 5
She also
declarations such as the Tunis Agenda constitute soft law.
they
further,
mature
argues that as principles of internet governance
of
principles
"general
and
may evolve into a "customary framework"
22 6
not
are
arguments
these
However,
international internet law."
universally accepted, and, at best, there is a weak case to argue that
internet governance principles are soft law principles.
Nonetheless, the principles of internet openness, security, and
privacy can help in applying international trade agreements such as
GATS or PTAs. Under the general exceptions, a WTO panel could
assess whether a GATS-inconsistent measure may be justified on
various grounds such as protecting public morals or public order
(GATS Article XIV(a)), or obtaining compliance with GATS-consistent
domestic laws, including privacy and/or cybersecurity laws (GATS
Article XJV(c)).227 Some examples include the Chinese Firewall, which
prevents data flows into China from several websites, and the GDPR,
which places restrictions on how data transfers are conducted to
countries outside of the EU. 228 Here, it might be useful to assess how
these measures affect the balance between internet openness, security,
and privacy, particularly their technical efficacy in achieving the said
policy objectives. These factors could form important evidence in
assessing the necessity of the measures to achieve the said objectives,

224. Wolfgang Kleinwachter, Internet principle hype: how soft law is used to
regulate the Internet, AFRICANN, (July 25, 2011), https://lists.afrinic.net/pipermail/
africann/2011-August/003811.html [https://perma.cc/6VXW-68K9] (archived Jan. 20,
2019).
225. KULESZA, supra note 122, at 136-38, 144-55.
226. Id.
227. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 22, Annex 1B, art. XIV.
228. The term "Great Firewall of China" was coined by Barme and Ye, referring to
the online censorship and surveillance tools employed by the Chinese Ministry of Public
Security. See Geremeie R. Barme & Sang Ye, The Great Firewall of China, WIRED (Jan.
6, 1997, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/1997/06/china-3/ [https://perma.cc/Y8AATXH2] (archived Jan. 20, 2019); see also Human Rights Watch, How Censorship Works
in China: A Brief Overview, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH VOL. 18, NO. 8(C), 9 (2006),
https://www.hrw.org/reports/2006/chinaO806/china0806webwcover.pdf
[https://perma.cc/9Q23-CUDE] (archived Jan. 20, 2019).
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as well as exploring other less restrictive alternative measures.2 2 9
Thus, WTO Panels will need a basic understanding of the impact of
data restrictive measures on the balance between openness and
security or privacy in the internet network to make an informed
assessment under the GATS exceptions. 2 30 In doing so, the panels
already have options such as examining amicus curiae briefs from
relevant international institutions or civil society bodies that are
submitted in a dispute 23 1 as well as inviting technical or policy experts
to provide input or technical evidence on relevant issues. 232
The assessment of a data restrictive measure under GATS Article
XIV primarily entails balancing international trade obligations and
domestic policy. However, in the context of cross-border data flows,
another evident conflict is that between a government's understanding
of how the internet should be regulated and the multistakeholder
principles of internet openness, security, and privacy. 233 The latter
conflict is much harder to address in WTO law as internet norms or
standards are typically prepared either by private bodies or
multistakeholder internet governance institutions and thus have no
legal effect. 234 However, certain experts argue that since informal
lawmaking through multistakeholder declarations or private
standards is common in certain fields of governance (like internet
governance), their relevance cannot be completely ignored in
interpreting WTO agreements. 235 The existing jurisprudence in WTO
law however suggests that applying such standards is very difficult in
practice, 2 36 thus placing limits on using principles derived from
international declarations and extralegal technical codes.

229. See, e.g., DIANE DESIERTO, PUBLIC POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW:
THE ICESCR IN TRADE, FINANCE, AND INVESTMENT 189-206 (2015); John B. Morris, Jr.,
Injecting the Public Interest into Internet Standards, in OPENING STANDARDS: THE
GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABILITY 11 (Laura DeNardis et al. eds., 2011).

230.

See supra Part 0.D (discussing complementarity of internet openness,

security and privacy).

231. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibitionof CertainShrimp
and Shrimp Products, TV 105-08, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998).
232. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 22, Annex 2, art. 13.2.
233. See Gunther Teubner & Peter Korth, Two Kinds of Legal Pluralism:Collision
of TransnationalRegimes in the Double Fragmentation of World Society, in REGIME
INTERACTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: FACING FRAGMENTATION 23, 23-53 (2012).

234. See, e.g., Memorandum from S. Hambridge on Netiquette Guidelines, supra
note 11; see also Biel Company, A Public Law Approach to Internet Standard Setting, 7
GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 49, 54-61 (2016).
235. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How
WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 269 (2003); Joost

Pauwelyn, Rule-Based Trade 2.0? The Rise of Informal Rules and International
Standards and How They May Outcompete WTO Treaties, 17 J. INT'L ECON. L. 739, 748
(2014).

236. For example, both in United States-Gambling and Argentina-Financial
Services, the WTO AB did not consider the standards set by Financial Task Action Force
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D. FramingNew Rules on Cross-BorderData Flows and Data
Localisation
Despite their limited relevance in applying and interpreting
international trade law, the principles of internet openness, security,
and privacy can be highly relevant and informative in framing new
rules on cross-border data flows and data localisation. Currently, these
two issues are very topical at the WTO and are also being negotiated
in other PTAs. For example, several of the proposals submitted by
WTO members refer to the importance of the free flow of data to
electronic commerce, removing data localisation barriers, and building
an open, secure, and reliable regulatory environment for electronic
commerce, including issues of privacy, consumer protection, and
cybersecurity.2 3 7 . Similarly, recent PTAs such as the CPTPP and
Agreement (USMCA)2 38 contain
United States-Canada-Mexico
provisions on cross-border data flows and data localisation, as well as
certain basic requirements for implementing a regulatory framework
on data protection and undertaking cooperation on cybersecurity
issues. 2 39
GATS is a pre-internet era treaty and was not designed for
contextualising trade in a digital world; thus, internet security and
privacy were not recognised as essential preconditions for the free flow
of services across borders. The only tool available under GATS is for
WTO members to argue that their cybersecurity or privacy measures
fall under the existing exceptions, presuming that internet security
and privacy are only relevant in the domestic context but not in a global
or transnational context. This deficiency however could be addressed
by acknowledging the role of internet security and privacy in
enhancing the free flow of data and prohibiting data localisation.
Further, domestic regulations in the field of electronic commerce could
be adopted that ensure an appropriate balance between internet
openness, security, and privacy in the domestic regulatory framework

relevant for the legal analysis. US-Gambling, supra note 21; Appellate Body Report,
Argentina-MeasuresRelating to T-ade in Goods and Services, WTO Doc. WT/DS453/AB/R
and Add.1 (adopted May 9, 2016).
237. See, e.g., Work Programmed on Electronic Commerce, Communication from
Canada, Chile, Colombia, C6te d'Ivoire, the European Union, the Republic of Korea,
Mexico, Montenegro, Paraguay, Singapore and Turkey, Trade Policy, the WTO and the
Digital Economy, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/116, JOB/CTG/4 JOB/SERV/248, JOB/IP/21
JOB/DEV/42 (Jan. 13, 2017); Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, Non-Paperfor
the Discussions on Electronic Commerce/Digital Trade from Japan, WTO Doc.
JOB/GC/100 (July 25, 2016); Work Programme on Electronic Commerce, Non-Paperfrom
the United States, WTO Doc. JOB/GC/94 (July 4, 2016).
238. Agreement Between the United States of America, the United Mexican
States, and Canada, art. 19, Nov. 30, 2018, https://ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-tradeagreements/united-states- mexico-canada-agreement/agreement-between
[https://perma.cc/87RL-JTLD] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
239. See Mishra, supra note 17.
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for digital trade. Seventy-one countries (including the EU, as a whole)
are now involved in plurilateral discussions and negotiations on
electronic commerce at the WTO, including on the above issues. 2 40 In
each of these cases, the principles of internet governance can be
instructive in devising balanced rules by considering the open
architecture of the internet and its complex interplay with the security
and privacy features. 24 1

V.

TYING MULTISTAKEHOLDER AND MULTILATERAL PROCESSES TO
SUPPORT DIGITAL TRADE

Both international trade law and internet governance principles
are directed towards forming a globally connected world. While rules
in WTO law are aimed at enabling global, integrated markets, thus
creating a level playing field for businesses across all member
countries, the internet governance regime is directed towards forming
a global, interconnected communications network that supports
seamless transactions. Hence, several experts have suggested that
these parallel tracks of multilateral negotiations in international trade
law should be coordinated with multistakeholder processes in internet
governance to achieve optimal results. 242
The idea of collaborating across different international
institutions is not entirely new to trade institutions such as the WTO.
Previously, WTO members recognised that cooperation between the
WTO and other international organisations such as the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund was necessary to "achiev[e]
greater coherence in global economic policymaking." 243 In the
Declaration on the Contribution of the World Trade Organization to
Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking, WTO
members agreed that incoherence in the global economic system

240. World Trade Organization, Joint Statement on Electronic Commerce, WTO
Doc. WTIMIN(17)/60 (Dec. 13, 2017).
241. See Andrew D. Mitchell & Neha Mishra, Data at the Docks: Modernizing
International Trade Law for the Digital Economy, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 1073,
1127-29 (2017).
242. See, e.g., PETER F. COWHEY & JONATHAN D. AARONSON, DIGITAL DNA:
DISRUPTION AND THE CHALLENGES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 233-58 (2017); William J.

Drake, Background Paper for the Workshop on Data Localization and Barriers to
TransborderData Flows 20 (World Econ. Forum, Sept. 14-15, 2016). But see Steven
Burnstein & Erin Hannah, The WTO And Institutional (In)Coherence in Global
Economic Governance, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION

778, 801 (Amrita Narlikar et al. eds., 2012).
243. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the Contribution of the World
Trade Organization to Achieving Greater Coherence in Global Economic Policymaking
1 5 (Dec.
15,
1993),
https://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/32-dcohr.pdf
[https://perma.cc/SA2A-KMWZ] (archived Feb. 6, 2019).
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arising due to issues "outside the trade field," "cannot be redressed
244
A similar
through measures taken in the trade field alone."
law
international
in
coherence
achieve
to
initiative may be critical
governing cross-border data flows.
The collaboration between trade institutions such as the WTO and
multistakeholder internet governance institutions is also essential for
reasons of expediency. Trade negotiations are typically slow and often
do not yield concrete results. On the other hand, internet
multistakeholder bodies are more experienced in dealing with the
informal and dynamic nature of technical standard setting on internet
policy issues. 245 For example, as soon as the engineers at IETF become
aware of privacy or security risks in an internet protocol, they can
immediately fix it.24 6 However, if governments set these standards
agreements, they cannot be addressed as
through trade
expeditiously.

24 7

Several initiatives are now underway to increase cross-sectoral
and internet
engagement between the international trade
248
The WTO
fields.
of
both
communities, despite the distinct cultures
experts,
trade
together
brought
Public Forum in the last three years
rights
human
and
academics, internet policy advocates, companies,
of
facets
different
institutions under one roof to openly discuss
249
The
stakeholders.
electronic commerce and how they affect various
issue of cross-border data flows was one of the most highly debated
issues. 2 50 Trade experts are also showing more willingness to
participate in open fora such as the IGF. The last few IGFs have
included dedicated sessions on trade and internet governance, which

244. Id.
245. See Stavros Gadinis, Three Pathways to Global Standards:Private, Regulator
and the Ministry Networks, 109 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2015).
246. John B. Morris Jr., Injecting the Public Interest into Internet Standards, in
OPENING STANDARDS: THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF INTEROPERABiLITY 3, 5 (2011).

247. Id. at 7.
248. Id. at 8.
249. See, e.g., WTO Public Forum 2018, Session 76 Summary, Data Localisation:
Balancing Trade Disciplines and National Policy Objectives (Oct. 4, 2018),
https://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/public-foruml8-e/rep_76.pdf [https://perma.cc/8
EZD-L4M9] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); WTO Public Forum 2018, Session 17, Trust, Trade
and Technology: E-commerce that Works for Consumers (Oct. 2, 2018),
htm [htt
https://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/publicforuml8_e/pfl8programme-e.
ps://perma.cc/93MC-LYLF] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); WTO Public Forum 2017, Session 83,
28, 2017),
Could WTO E-Commerce Proposals Help Development? (Sept.
https://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/public-foruml7-e/pfl7programme-e.htm
[https://perma.cclNZ4G-XP9Z] (archived Feb. 6, 2019); WTO Public Forum 2017, Session
35, What Are the PotentialImplications of Recent WTO Ecommerce Proposalson Digital
https://www.wto.org/english/forums
2017),
27,
(Sept.
Industrial Policy?
(archived
[https://perma.cc/NZ4G-XP9Z]
e/public_foruml7_e/pfl7programme-e.htm
Feb. 6, 2019).
250. See, e.g., WTO Public Forum 2018, Session 76 Summary, supra note 249;
WTO Public Forum 2018, Session 17, supra note 249; WTO Public Forum 2017, Session
83, supra note 249; WTO Public Forum 2017, Session 35, supra note 249.
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included both trade negotiators and internet policy experts, and
discussed very openly as to how trade and non-trade values can be
balanced in regulating cross-border data flows. 25 1 Even a joint study
on electronic commerce issues by the WTO and relevant internet
governance institutions can assist in developing a better
understanding of trade and non-trade issues related to cross-border
data flows.

VI. CONCLUSION

International trade law cannot be isolated from internet
governance. This Article argues that trade rules are or can be
compatible with the idea of a globally connected and secure internet,
particularly through the principles of internet openness, security, and
privacy. Further, a possibility also exists of applying the principles of
internet openness, security, and privacy in evaluating data restrictive
measures in international trade law, despite their nonbinding nature,
particularly as technical or factual evidence. This Article also points
out the importance of internet security and privacy for enabling the
free flow of data. However, the majority of international trade
agreements, including the multilateral framework of GATS, were
designed well before the current digital economy era, and hence, do not
contain relevant provisions. Recent PTAs have, however, taken a more
informed, comprehensive approach in their Electronic Commerce
Chapters, and there is increasing pressure to replicate such provisions
in WTO agreements. In that context, the principles of internet
openness, security, and privacy can be highly informative in the
shaping of a balanced and appropriate regulatory framework for crossborder data flows. Therefore, despite the evident nonbinding nature of
technical codes and high-level principles governing the internet, trade
negotiators should pay close attention to these principles while
devising new rules on data flows and data localisation and aim to
bridge the existing gaps between trade rules and the global governance
framework for the internet and data flows.

251. For notes of the author from the 2018 Internet Governance Forum sessions,
see U.N. INTERNET GOVERNANCE FORUm, https://www.intgovforum.org/multilingual/
(last visited Mar. 13, 2019) [https://perma.cc/9YX8-HDJP] (archived Feb. 25, 2019).

